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"If courts and litigants approach discovery with the mindset of pro-
portionality, there is the potential for real savings in both dollars 
and time to resolution. "1 
As courts grapple with the data explosion and an ever-expanding vol-
ume of electronically stored information/ they are more frequently turning 
1. John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL 
L. REv. 455,460 (2010). 
2. Gil Keteltas & John Rosenthal, Discovery of Electronic Evidence, in 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE I, 3 (Paul Rice ed., 2d ed. 2008); see also The 
Sedona Conference Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, II SEDONA 
CONF. J. 289, 301 (2010) ("It is well documented that the volume of ESI is exploding in 
every comer of the digital world, increasing the volume of potentially discoverable infor-
mation."); Greg Muscarella, Opening the Doors of Predictive Coding, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 
BLOG (June 22, 20 12), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-
blog/20 12/06/22/opening-the-doors-of-ediscovery-predictive-coding ("It's no mystery that 
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to proportionality principles3 to control the costs, burdens, and delays asso-
ciated with the discovery process.4 Courts,5 clients,6 and counseF all want 
proportionality to be the touchstone of discovery. To do so effectively, 
however, will require a rule change.8 
In this Article, we propose amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to more clearly condition the scope of permissible discovery on 
principles of proportionality. We also suggest amendments underscoring 
counsel's duty to engage in proportional discovery. These changes will de-
crease eDiscovery costs and burdens, discourage abusive practices, and help 
adapt the rules to evolving technology. 
the volume of electronically stored information (ESI) organizations deal with continues to 
increase exponentially."). 
3. John Jablonski, Raising the Bar on Proportionality?, in PRESERVATION AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 19, 19 (Brad Harris & Ron Hedges eds., 20 II), available at 
http://www3.1egalholdpro.com/rs/zapproved/images/WP-PreservationandProportionality-
Nov ll.pdf ("Proportionality is in vogue, despite being more or Jess ignored since its intro-
duction in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983."). 
4. SYMANTEC, INFORMATION RETENTION AND EDISCOVERY SURVEY 4 (2011), avail-
able at http:/ /www.symantec.com/about/news/resources/press _ kits/detail.jsp?pkid= ediscov-
erysurvey _ 20 II. The survey contains data gathered from the IT and legal departments of 
2,000 global enterprises with a minimum of I ,000 employees. /d. at 6. 
5. RANDALL R. RADER, THE STATE OF PATENT LITIGATION 7 (2012), available at 
apps.americanbar.org/intelprop/spring20 12/coursematerials/docs/E-Discovery_ in _Patent_ 
Litigation/TheState_of_PatentLitigation-ChiefJudgeRader.pdf. ("[T]he greatest weakness of 
the US court system is its expense .... [T]he driving factor for that expense is discovery 
excesses. Electronic recordkeeping in the modern age has multiplied the expense of looking 
behind every curtain."). 
6. Robert Hardaway, Dustin D. Berger & Andrea Defield, £-Discovery's Threat to 
Civil Litigation: Reevaluating Rule 26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 522 
(2011) ("Indeed, many civil litigants may find that they cannot sustain the costs of the dis-
covery-related litigation. As a result, these civil litigants will never be able to obtain a judi-
cial resolution of the merits of their case."). 
7. CORINA GERETY, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., EXCESS 
& ACCESS: CONSENSUS ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE LANDSCAPE 9 (2011) ("'[L]itigation 
is too expensive.' More than three out of four attorneys in every group [surveyed] expressed 
agreement with this statement."); see also Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Fed-
eral Rules, Keynote Address at the University of Baltimore Law Review Symposium (Mar. 
13, 2008), in 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 321, 324-26 (2008) (discussing how law firms must adapt 
to modern discovery to maintain clients and prevent malpractice). 
8. Wayne B. Mason, LCJ: Providing New Impetus for Reform on Many Levels, 
METROPOLITAN COR. COUNS., June 2012, at I, I ("Despite the best intentions, any hope or 
expectation that [the 2006 Federal Rules] amendments would curb the discovery 'explosion' 
have been disappointed over the last several years. Contrary to the expressed intent of the 
amendments, discovery burdens, fueled by court decisions based upon indistinct and inade-
quate guidelines, have increased exponentially. Broad-based rule reform thus has been 
shown to be essential to help achieve the consistency, uniformity, and predictability that is 
necessary to reduce the costs and burdens of modern litigation."). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Discovery has always been expensive. Yet in the digital age, the costs 
of discovery are spiraling out of controP Unfortunately, true to Moore's 
law, 10 discovery will likely become more costly as electronically stored in-
formation (ESI) continues on the path of exponential growth. 11 As a result, 
the trend of data growth will likely increase the weighty discovery burdens 
that litigants-especially organizations-already bear. Consider the follow-
ing example. In 2008, the average end-user may have owned 100 gigabytes 
of information. 12 Just four years later, that number is now closer to 1 ,000,13 
all of which could be subject to review for discovery purposes in a given 
action. 14 This calculus is weighty for individual parties, but crushing for 
enterprises with thousands of employees, each of whom may respectively 
have a terabyte of potentially discoverable information. 15 
9. Carroll, supra note 1, at 456 ("A recent study done by the American Bar Associ-
ation Section found that 82% of the lawyers surveyed ... agreed discovery is too expen-
sive."); accord Pettit v. Pulte Mortg., LLC, No. 2:11-cv-00149-GMN-PAL, 2011 WL 
5546422, at *5 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2011) ("Discovery is expensive."). 
I 0. Moore's Law Inspires Intel Innovation, INTEL, 
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/silicon-innovations/moores-law-technology.html 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (stating Intel co-founder Gordon Moore predicted that the num-
ber of transistors on a chip would double every two years). Essentially, it predicts exponen-
tial growth in computing power and an analogous increase in electronic data. See id. 
II. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, AN E-DISCOVERY MODEL ORDER 
2 (2011), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories 
/announcements!Ediscovery _Model_ Order.pdf [hereinafter MODEL ORDER] ("In recent years, 
the exponential growth of and reliance on electronic documents and communications has 
exacerbated such discovery abuses."). 
12. See Keteltas & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
13. !d.; Jablonski, supra note 3, at 19-20 n.15. 
14. Hardaway, Berger & Defield, supra note 6, at 528-29 ("Nor are the discovery 
horror stories limited to the monumental cases. They now include even simple and routine 
cases, including divorce cases."). 
15. SYMANTEC, STATE OF INFORMATION GLOBAL RESULTS 5 (2012), available at 
http://www .symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/20 12-state-of-information-
global.en-us.pdf ("The typical small and mid-sized business (SMB) has 563 terabytes of data 
across all stores and devices. While that might sound like a lot, it is dwarfed by the volume 
of information the typical enterprise has: about I 00,000 terabytes."); see also Dean Gon-
sowksi, Review-less £-Discovery Review, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 BLOG (July 21, 2008), 
http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-blog/2008/07/21/review-less-e-discovery-
review ("Back in the day, information was viewed in terms [of] banker boxes of information, 
and even in the most document intensive discovery matters this measuring stick belied the 
belief that armies of attorneys could conceivably conquer the massive document review 
problem. But now, we often see clients that process routine matters containing terabytes of 
information."). 
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This trend of growth figures to continue given the proliferation of new 
communication and storage media. 16 Indeed, it appears that there is or will 
be a discoverable recordable digital format for everything conceivable: from 
email, 17 voice over Internet Protocol (VoiP) 18 and social media, 19 to short 
message service (SMS)20 and instant messages (IM)_21 Even the GPS in your 
car could be subject to discovery.22 ESI is not just limited to text or audio 
data either-it even encompasses data about that data.23 Meanwhile, all of 
this electronic detail is archived and stored in an increasing number of 
smartphones, tablet computers, servers, clouds/4 and databases, often with 
multiple redundancies and no central index.25 With an average cost of at 
16. By 2020, "the amount of digital information created and replicated in the world 
will grow to an almost inconceivable 35 trillion gigabytes as all major forms of media-
voice, TV, radio, print-complete the journey from analog to digital. ... [In 2009, the digital 
universe] grew by 62% to nearly 800,000 petabytes .... [B]y 2020, our Digital Universe will 
be 44 TIMES AS BIG as it was in 2009." JoHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, IDC, THE DIGITAL 
UNIVERSE DECADE-ARE YOU READY? I (2010), available at 
http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-digital-universe-are-you-ready.pdf. 
17. Keteltas & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 
99 C 8105,2002 WL 1264004, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002) ("E-mails have replaced other 
forms of communication besides just paper-based communication. Many informal messages 
that were previously relayed by telephone or at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail. 
Additionally, computers have the ability to capture several copies (or drafts) of the same e-
mail, thus multiplying the volume of documents. All of these e-mails must be scanned for 
both relevance and privilege."). 
18. Hardaway, Berger & Defield, supra note 6, at 553. 
19. Social media communications are requested for production at least 41% of the 
time. SYMANTEC, supra note 4, at 9. 
20. The Symantec Survey groups SMS and 1M together. /d.; see also Laura M. 
Holson, Text Messages: Digital Lipstick on the Collar, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2009), 
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/09text.html (discussing the role of text messages in family 
law). 
21. 1M and SMS are requested for production at least 44% of the time. SYMANTEC, 
supra note 4, at 9. 
22. Craig Ball, GPS Evidence Might Drive Your Case Home, L. TECH. NEWS (Oct. 
29, 2008), http:/ /www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleL TN.jsp?id= 120242 
5606808&GPS _Evidence_ Might_ Drive_ Your_ Case_ Home&slretum=20 121021120935. But 
see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2011) (rendering the use of GPS tracking 
devices on motor vehicles a search under the Fourth Amendment). Cf Hardaway, Berger & 
Defield, supra note 6, at 522-26 (discussing some drastic differences between criminal and 
civil discovery procedures). 
23. Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Ob-
taining Metadata, 13 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 6 (2007) (asserting that the 2006 amendments 
to the Federal Rules "arguably impose[d] a modest presumption in favor of preserving and 
producing relevant metadata"). 
24. See generally Dean Gonsowski, Compliance in the Cloud & the Implication on 
Electronic Discovery, in CLOUD FORENSICS (Keyun Ruan ed., forthcoming 2013). 
25. Keteltas & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
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least $18,000 per gigabyte for document review26-not to mention the costs 
of processing and collection27-discovery of all matters relevant to a claim 
or defense28 can quickly surpass the value of the controversy.29 In summary, 
the information explosion has generated and will continue to generate ex-
tremely complex and expensive litigation conundrums for organizations. 
Despite this changed technological landscape, discovery practice un-
der the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules or Rules) remains 
entrenched in the idea of complete and full disclosure of all facts, no matter 
how remotely related to a claim or defense.30 While this sweeping right of 
discovery may advance the just determination of a case,31 it does little to 
advance the equally important purposes of speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation.32 To achieve all three purposes of the Federal Rules33 in the digital 
age, proportionality must be the defining principle underlying the discovery 
process.34 
26. NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INSTIT. FOR CIVIL JUST., WHERE 
THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY 20 (2012), available at http://www.rand.org/content/darn/rand/pubs/monographs/ 
2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf. 
27. Eighteen thousand dollars may actually be a conservative estimate, as some 
commentators have placed the figure at closer to $180,000, including locating, formatting, 
reviewing, and transporting services. David Nuffer & Philip Favro, Proportionality Demysti-
jied: Discover How to Reduce the Costs and Burdens of eDiscovery by Following Propor-
tionality Standards, INSIDE COUNS. (June 12, 2012, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/webseminars/proportionality-demystified-discover-how-to-
reduce; see also Dean Gonsowski, Morton's Fork, Oil Filters the Nexus with Information 
Governance, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 BLOG (May 10, 2012), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-
discovery-blog/20 12/05/ I 0/mortons-fork-oil-fi lters-the-nexus-with-information-govemance-
ediscovery (evaluating and summarizing several different reports regarding per GB ESI 
production costs). 
28. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(1). 
29. See Keteltas & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 8. Given this empirical data, it is not 
implausible to suggest that in the next ten years, paper discovery could virtually disappear 
into a growing vortex of eDiscovery. Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rule-
making Responses to £-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. I, 10-11 (2004) ("[O]ver ninety 
percent of the 'information' developed by corporations and governmental agencies is pres-
ently electronic and never put into hard copy form. In the future (if not the present) we may 
expect the 'paperless' office. In that setting, what else can civil discovery pursue but elec-
tronically-stored materials?" (footnote omitted)). 
30. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,682 (1958) (explain-
ing that discovery is designed to "make a trial less a game ofblindman's buff and more a fair 
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent"). 
31. See FED. R. Clv. P. I (mandating that the Federal Rules "be construed and ad-
ministered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding"). 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See Paul W. Grimm et a!., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-
Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 381, 402-06 (2008) (arguing that 
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Remarkably, this notion of proportionality is already extant in the 
Federal Rules.35 The Rules ostensibly require that the benefits of discovery 
be commensurate with its corresponding burdens.36 Found in Rule 26, pro-
portionality has the potential to alleviate the troubling costs, burdens, and 
delays associated with eDiscovery.37 Simply put, the proportionality rule 
empowers courts to restrict the liberal bounds of federal discovery prac-
tice.38 For example, discovery must be limited where requests are unreason-
ably cumulative or duplicative,39 the discovery can be obtained from an al-
ternative source that is less expensive or burdensome,40 or the burden or 
expense of the discovery outweighs its benefit.41 Moreover, proportionality 
also requires counsel to certify that they will conduct discovery within the 
parameters of reasonableness.42 
While the proportionality rule has been in place for nearly three dec-
ades, its use up until recently has been sporadic at best.43 Hidden in the mas-
proportionality provisions governing production should also apply by analogy to preserva-
tion); cf Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 516 (D. Md. 2010) (dis-
cussing the nationwide concern regarding the lack of a national standard and diverging local 
standards regarding proportionality applicability to preservation). 
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
36. !d. 
37. Carroll, supra note I, at 460; see, e.g., Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 
No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2012 WL 1299379, at *7-10 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (applying propor-
tionality standards to curtail overly broad discovery requests). 
38. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i); see, e.g., Nicholas v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc., 373 
F.3d 537, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming protective order that prevented discovery 
deemed duplicative of depositions already taken). 
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i); see, e.g., Grabenstein v. Arrow Elecs., Inc., No. 
10-cv-02348-MSK-KLM, 2012 WL 1388595, at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2012) (rejecting sanc-
tions where plaintiff had obtained the sought-after ESI from an alternative source even 
though the defendant had violated a regulatory retention obligation). 
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-
cv-1445 (NPM/DEP), 2011 WL 2154279, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 20ll) (denying a mo-
tion to compel production of marginally relevant ESI given the nominal amount in contro-
versy vis-a-vis the high costs of production, all while acknowledging that the multinational 
corporate defendant could afford to produce the requested discovery); accord Thermal De-
sign, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg. Prods., No. 08-C-828, 2011 WL 1527025, at *I (E.D. Wis. Apr. 
20, 2011) ("Courts should not countenance fishing expeditions simply because the party 
resisting discovery can afford to comply."). 
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) ("[A]n attorney or party certifies that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry ... with re-
spect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is ... neither unreasonable nor unduly 
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the 
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action."). 
43. Ron Hedges, 'Proportionality' Under the Federal Rules: An Overview, in 
PRESERVATION AND PROPORTIONALITY, supra note 3, at 5, 5-6; Jordan M. Singer, Propor-
tionality's Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 145, 169 (2012) (discussing how 
the structure of legal education, which typically devotes "relatively little time on discovery," 
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sive verbiage of the longest rule of civil procedure,44 proportionality has 
been mostly overlooked since its enactment in 1983. Rightly or wrongly, 
few have paid it much attention given the liberal scope of discovery first 
authorized under the Federal Rules. It is only after the broad scope of dis-
covery is delineated that the limitations of proportionality-buried at the 
end of the provision-are even mentioned.45 In like manner, the proportion-
ality certification requirement remains tucked away and largely overlooked 
at the very end of Rule 26.46 
To address these drafting deficiencies and better emphasize propor-
tionality in federal discovery practice, we propose that Rule 26 be amended 
to more clearly condition the permissible scope of discovery on proportion-
ality principles. We also suggest that Rules 26 and 37 be amended to further 
emphasize counsel's obligation to engage in proportional discovery. 
Surprisingly enough, a blueprint for such amendments is already in 
place in the State of Utah. Effective November 1, 2011, Utah implemented 
sweeping changes to its civil discovery practice through amended Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 26.47 Among its many laudable provisions, this new rule in-
cludes a clear mandate that proportionality is the standard governing dis-
covery in Utah: "Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the claim or defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the 
standards ofproportionality."48 Furthermore, Utah Civil Procedure Rules 26 
and 37 bring needed emphasis to the proportionality certification require-
ment that is presently lacking in the Federal Rules.49 
Such amendments to the Rules would more clearly emphasize propor-
tionality as a meaningful principle and place litigants in a better position to 
realize both the speedy and the inexpensive determination of their case. 50 
contributes to disproportionate discovery abuses); JoHN M. BARKETT, THE 7TH CIRCUIT E-
DISCOVERY PILOT PROJECT: WHAT WE MIGHT LEARN AND WHY IT MATTERS TO EVERY 
LITIGANT IN AMERICA 23-24 (2011), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/civil_procedure/docs/barkett.decemberl 
l.pdf. 
44. Rule 26 accounts for eight pages of the actual rules' text. FED. R. CJv. P. tbl. of 
contents. The entire rules portion of the Federal Rules is ninety-six pages long; nearly I 0% 
of the Rules are dedicated to Rule 26. !d. 
45. FED. R. CJv. P. 26(b)(l) ("Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of 
discovery is as follows: ... [a]ll discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)."); see also Nuffer & Favro, supra note 27. 
46. FED. R. CJv. P. 26(g); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 
357 (D. Md. 2008) (observing that Rule 26(g) is perhaps "the most important, but apparently 
least understood or followed, of the discovery rules"). 
47. See UTAH R. Clv. P. 26. 
48. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(I) (emphasis added). 
49. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), 37(a)(3), 37(b)(2). 
50. Philip Favro, Rule I and Information Governance-The Bookends of Cost-
Effective e-Discovery, EDDE J., Summer 2011, at 10, 10, available at 
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Indeed, recent decisions have demonstrated that certain courts are doing just 
that: championing proportionality principles to reduce discovery burdens 
and their attendant evils.51 In contrast, without amendments to the Federal 
Rules, circuit and district courts will continue to take the initiative in creat-
ing their own rules that promote proportionality.52 While these efforts have 
in some cases been very successful in emphasizing proportionality, they 
also create diverging standards and practices. 53 A top-down amendment 
approach is the only practical way to uniformly "secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."54 
This Article will consider these subjects. In Part I, we delve into the 
proportionality rule and further clarify why amendments to the Federal 
Rules are needed. In particular, Section LA discusses the background and 
text of the rule, including the effect of succeeding amendments. Section I.B 
examines recent proportionality case law and spotlights several best practic-
es which have emerged from that jurisprudence, all grounded in the princi-
ple of proportionality. Section I.C reviews the rules and practices that vari-
ous circuit and district courts have promulgfited to more effectively address 
proportionality in their jurisdictions. Section lD analyzes the shortcomings 
of the current Rules regime and why they justify amending the Federal 
Rules. In Part II, we discuss the Utah Rules and the feasibility of using cer-
tain of those provisions as a blueprint for modifying the Federal Rules. We 
conclude in Part III with specific proposals to amend the Rules to better 
address discovery costs in the digital age. 
I. STATE OF EXISTING LAW ON PROPORTIONALITY IN DISCOVERY 
Proportionality is not a new concept. 55 Though formally introduced in-
to the Federal Rules in 1983, proportionality finds its origin in Rule P 6 and 
runs implicitly throughout the Federal Rules.57 Since its emergence in 1983, 
proportionality has been expanded and reinforced to give it further effect_58 
http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/scitech/ST203001/PublicDocuments!EDDE%20JOU 
RNAL%20-%20volume%202%20issuc%203.pdf. 
51. See discussion infra Section I. B. 
52. See discussion infra Section I.C. 
53. See Grimm et al., supra note 34, at 392 (lamenting the complexities that organi-
zations face with respect to preserving documents given the absence of "clear and universal 
proportionality guidelines applicable to the pre-litigation duty to preserve"). 
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
55. Carroll, supra note l, at 457. 
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules "should be construed and admin-
istered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceed-
ing"). 
57. Hedges, supra note 43, at 5 ("Proportionality may be explicit in some of the 
Rules, but is implied throughout."). 
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
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Yet despite such efforts, it is still not apparent to many jurists and lawyers 
that discovery must be consistent with proportionality standards.59 In this 
Part, we analyze the proportionality standard, demonstrate its effectiveness 
in reducing the costs and burdens of discovery, and justify the basis for an 
amendment to better ensure that proportionality becomes the touchstone of 
federal discovery practice. 
A. Proportionality in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
1. Rule 1: The Foundation for Proportionality 
Federal Rule 1 establishes a compelling directive that is tailor made 
for proportionality. More than just a vestigial preamble to the Federal Rules, 
Rule 1 requires the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding."60 While not expressly a proportionality rule, the 
general principles advanced in Rule 1-particularly cost reduction and ex-
peditious proceedings-are harmonious with the overall purposes of propor-
tional discovery.61 This is apparent from the number of discovery related 
cases that recognize the value of the Rule 1 decree in addressing unreasona-
ble eDiscovery expenses and delays.62 
Another important aspect of Rule 1 in the context of proportionality is 
that it places an equal obligation on courts and counsel to ensure that its 
objectives are met.63 This may come as a surprise to some attorneys, who 
59. Hedges, supra note 43, at 5-6; FED. R. C!v. P. 26 advisory committee's note 
("The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts have not implemented these limitations 
with the vigor that was contemplated. This otherwise redundant cross-reference has been 
added to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b )(2) to control excessive 
discovery." (citation omitted)). 
60. FED. R. C!v. P. I. First enacted in 1938, some commentators go so far as to call 
Rule 1 the "Master Rule." Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal 
Rules, 87 DENY. U. L. REV. 287, 287, 289 n.8 (2010). 
61. David Cohen, Rule I Should Guide Us, in PRESERVATION AND 
PROPORTIONALITY, supra note 3, at 14, 14-15. 
62. See, e.g., Lee v. Max Int'l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1320-21 (lOth Cir. 2011) (dis-
missing plaintiffs' action after they failed to produce relevant documents in response to pre-
vious court orders); see also Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 997, 
I 009 (D. Ariz. 20 II) (reasoning that "judicial efficiency and the prompt resolution of litiga-
tion" supported a terminating sanction given defendants' evidence destruction and the result-
ing delays it caused); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 4867346, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (limiting and phasing the scope of discovery to achieve the Rule I man-
date pending the resolution of a motion to dismiss); Nycomed U.S. Inc. v. Glenmark Gener-
ics Ltd., No. 08-CV-5023 (CBA)(RLM), 2010 WL 3173785, at *II (E.D.N.Y. Aug. II, 
2010) (imposing a $125,000 monetary sanction on defendants for the "undue delay" caused 
by their discovery failings). 
63. FED. R. C!v. P. I advisory committee's note ("As officers of the court, attorneys 
share this responsibility with the judge to whom the case is assigned."). 
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view the adversarial process as a zero-sum game to be won at all costs.64 
Unfortunately, such a misguided view seems to be the norm in federal dis-
covery. Abuses can unfairly grind an action to a halt as parties "wage litiga-
tion"65 in an effort to obtain access to all potentially relevant ESI.66 Rule 1 
teaches that zealous advocacy in discovery must be tempered by the need to 
reduce costs and expedite matters, both of which are consistent with princi-
ples of proportionality.67 
2. The 1983 Amendments: The Proportionality Rule 
The principles underlying Rule 1 were formally introduced into dis-
covery practice in 1983 with a new round of amendments to the Federal 
Rules.68 In particular, Rule 26 was amended to include Rule 26(b)(2)(C)69 
64. See Singer, supra note 43 (arguing that the legal culture is responsible for foster-
ing a distributive discovery paradigm); see also Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the 
Lawyer's E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REv. 521, 554-56 (2009); Mancia v. 
Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 360-65 (D. Md. 2008); Network Computing 
Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 2004) ("'If there is a hell to 
which disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it be one in which the damned are 
eternally locked in discovery disputes with other lawyers of equally repugnant attributes."' 
(quoting Krueger v. Pelican Prod. Corp., No. CIV-87-2385-A (W.O. Okla. Feb. 24, 1989)). 
65. Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567, 570-71 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (urging courts to aggressively curb "cancerous" discovery abuses, curtail "pro-
miscuous" discovery and insist that "discovery devices be used as tools to facilitate litigation 
rather than as weapons to wage litigation"). 
66. Bowers v. NCAA, No. 97-2600 (JBS), 2008 WL 1757929, at *1-2, *4, *6 
(D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2008) (drawing on proportionality principles to deny plaintiffs request for 
additional discovery of marginally relevant ESI). 
67. Pettit v. Pulte Mortg., LLC, No. 2:11-cv-00149-GMN-PAL, 2011 WL 5546422, 
at *6 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2011) ("[T]his court will adopt a totality of the circumstances, fact-
specific approach and evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether prohibiting, delaying, or 
limiting discovery is appropriate to secure the just[,] speedy[,] and inexpensive determination 
of the case while a dispositive motion is pending."). 
68. Arthur Miller described the 1983 Rule 26 changes as the most worrisome of all 
the amendments and likened them to "a very high stakes poker game." ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 30 
(1984). In his opinion, the proportionality amendments introduced a third rail in civil litiga-
tion: the public interest and attendant social costs of prolonged discovery side-litigation. !d. 
The amendments turned the bench into the public's representative by authorizing judicial 
intervention to curb abuse that could needlessly absorb court time. See id. Miller feared that 
this intervention and emphasis on cooperation could subvert the adversarial process. See id. 
at 31-35; accord Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 698 (N.D. Ga. 2009) ("The 
judicial system uses scarce judicial resources that must be diverted from other cases to re-
solve discovery disputes."). 
69. As amended in 1983, the proportionality rule was then styled as Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(l). MILLER, supra note 68, at 32-33. The proportionality rule will be 
referred to herein by its present location in Rule 26(b)(2)(C). 
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and Rule 26(g).70 In so doing, the Advisory Committee was motivated by a 
growing body of commentators who sought increased judicial involvement 
to rein in abusive discovery.71 The reasoning at that time was that increased 
judicial oversight would be an effective means of addressing "redundant or 
disproportionate discovery. "72 
The proportionality rule was specifically encapsulated in Rule 
26(b)(2)(C). In accordance with the rule, courts were to limit discovery re-
quests that were unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.73 In like manner, 
discovery that could be obtained from an alternative source that was less 
expensive or burdensome was also to be curtailed.74 Finally, courts were 
counseled to limit discovery whose burden or expense was disproportionate 
to its benefits. 75 Through these new powers, courts were to "be more aggres-
sive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse."76 In particular, they 
were to be on the watch for lawyers who gamed the system by using dis-
covery for tactical advantage or intimidation.77 
To ensure compliance with the proportionality rule, a certification re-
quirement that mirrored Rule 11 was enacted in the form of Rule 26(g).78 
Under Rule 26(g), a lawyer certified by her signature that she would engage 
in proportional discovery, i.e., that a request, response, or objection com-
plied with proportionality principles.79 To properly incentivize counsel, the 
Advisory Committee inserted a mandatory sanctions trigger for unjustified 
violations ofRule 26(g).80 
70. Rule 26(g) was introduced as a corollary to amendments made to Rule II to 
curb discovery abuse by imposing a direct and sanctionable duty. Gensler, supra note 64, at 
557-59. 
71. Singer, supra note 43, at 179. 
72. FED. R. Clv. P. 26 advisory committee's note; Marcus, supra note 7, at 329; 
MILLER, supra note 68, at 32 ("There is only one way to reduce redundancy and dispropor-
tionality, and that way is through the federal judiciary. So we have sold the judges into slav-
ery. It is as simple as that. They are now the gatekeepers."). 
73. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 
74. !d. 
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
76. FED. R. Clv. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
77. In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 332 (N.D. Cal. 
1985) ("I have emerged from my contacts with these matters with an uneasy sense that the 
discovery system in large commercial cases more than occasionally may be perverted into an 
arena for economic power plays, that parties use discovery tools (or cast their responses to 
discovery requests) not so much to learn what the facts are, but more to muscle one another 
into attitudes conducive to favorable settlements."). 
78. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(g); Bottoms v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. ofBos., No. 11-cv-
01606-PAB-CBS, 2011 WL 6181423, at *4-5 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2011). 
79. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(g). 
80. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(g)(3) ("If a certification violates this rule without substantial 
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the 
signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an 
order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the violation."). 
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Contemporary commentary regarding Rule 26(g) makes clear that 
strict enforcement of the certification provision was the lynch pin for success 
of the proportionality rule.81 In the landmark opinion of Mancia v. Mayflow-
er Textile Services Co., the court painstakingly reviewed the purposes un-
derlying Rule 26(g).82 More specifically, the court singled out recycled dis-
covery requests and boilerplate objections as evils that Rule 26(g) was de-
signed to eliminate. 83 Lamenting that such practices were still all too preva-
lent in discovery, the court observed that Rule 26(g) was perhaps "the most 
important, but apparently least understood or followed, of the discovery 
rules."84 That view, shared by other discovery cognoscenti,85 perhaps best 
explains why the use of such boilerplate is still endemic today and contrib-
utes significantly to the costs of discovery.86 
3. The 2000 Amendments: Proportionality Reiterated 
Despite the unequivocal emphasis on proportionality in the 1983 
amendments, the Advisory Committee felt compelled to revisit and again 
spotlight the issue in 2000.87 The impetus for doing so was the Committee's 
observation that the judiciary had not enforced the proportionality rule 
"with the vigor that was contemplated" by the 1983 amendments.88 To help 
bring greater attention to the proportionality rule, a sentence was added at 
the end of Rule 26(b )(1) to reiterate that the permissible scope of discovery 
was conditioned on proportionality standards:89 "All discovery is subject to 
the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)."90 
Despite the Advisory Committee's best intentions, the 2000 amend-
ment still has not brought widespread use and acceptance of the proportion-
81. See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357-60 (D. 
Md. 2008). 
82. /d. 
83. /d. at 358; see also MILLER, supra note 68, at 35 ("So we try to tell the bar: 
'Don't do this or you are vulnerable to sanctions,' and we also try to tell the bench: 'If you 
see it, stop it.' So it is sort of a double whanuny-we are trying to get it from both ends."); 
accord In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328,331-32 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
84. Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357. 
85. Gensler, supra note 64, at 559 ("For twenty years, judges and lawyers alike paid 
little attention to Rule 26(g)."). 
86. See, e.g., Anderson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. WDQ-11-1188, 2011 
WL 4828891, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 2011); Bottoms v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. ofBos., 
No. 11-cv-01606-PAB-CBS, 2011 WL 6181423, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2011). 
87. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's note ("The Conunittee has been told 
repeatedly that courts have not implemented these limitations with the vigor that was con-
templated."). 
88. /d. 
89. /d. ("This otherwise redundant cross-reference has been added to emphasize the 
need for active judicial use of subdivision (b )(2) to control excessive discovery."). 
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). 
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ality rule in federal discovery practice.91 Although there are many factors 
driving the lack of use, one key reason is that many jurists and practitioners 
may still not know that the proportionality rule exists.92 Nor will they, so 
long as the conditioning language in Rule 26(b )(1) remains divorced from 
the overall scope of discovery. Indeed, the limiting sentence, found at the 
end of the provision and obscured by other intervening conditions, is com-
pletely segregated from the section defining the scope of discovery, which 
reads: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense."93 
4. The 2006 Amendments: Accommodating eDiscovery 
Just six years later, the Advisory Committee again revisited propor-
tionality. Heralding the arrival of the digital age, the 2006 amendments to 
the Federal Rules sought to accommodate the increasing pressures that ESI 
had placed on the discovery process. Recognizing the crushing burdens that 
ESI could pose for many organizations, the Committee implemented multi-
ple measures that could alleviate pain points surrounding the storage and 
retrieval of ESJ.94 
For example, the Committee clarified that the proportionality rule ap-
plied to ESI: "The limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all 
discovery of electronically stored information, including that stored on rea-
sonably accessible electronic sources."95 The amendments also broadened 
the scope of the proportionality rule by implementing new Rule 26(b)(2)(B). 
That provision limits the discovery of ESI that may not be "reasonably ac-
cessible because of undue burden or cost."96 While such data could still be 
subject to discovery, it could not be obtained unless the moving party estab-
lished a fact-specific showing of good cause and satisfied the protections of 
the proportionality rule.97 Meeting those requirements was by no means a 
"slam dunk" since, as the Committee observed, the burdens associated with 
91. Carroll, supra note 1, at 464 ("Thus, it appears that proportionality, which most 
suggest is a valuable tool for managing discovery, may be very underutilized."); see also 
Jablonksi, supra note 3, at 19. 
92. Nuffer & Favro, supra note 27 (discussing the lack of instruction regarding 
proportionality to practitioners); accord Singer, supra note 43, at 180-82. 
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). 
94. "The amendment to Rule 26(b )(2) is designed to address issues raised by diffi-
culties in locating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some electronically stored infor-
mation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
95. Jd. 
96. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
97. ld. 
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reviewing ESI for relevance and privilege could tip the scales against order-
ing the requested discovery.98 
By shifting the burden of good cause to the party seeking data that was 
not readily accessible and by requiring courts to consider the burdens placed 
on the producing party, the Committee implemented an enforcement mech-
anism that finally had the potential to alleviate certain narrow discovery 
burdens of organizations.99 Subsequent jurisprudence demonstrates that this 
approach to proportionality has in some cases been successful in pushing 
parties toward cooperation and compromise on the production of ESI that is 
difficult to access or proscribing such discovery altogether. 100 
B. Lessons from Recent Case Law Developments on Proportionality 
While proportionality standards were underused for years after they 
were first included in the Rules, they have been more widely embraced of 
late. Indeed, since the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules, certain circuit 
and district courts have championed proportionality as a benchmark for 
resolving troublesome eDiscovery .101 Though some commentators have 
argued that the proportionality rule has not been effective in this regard, 
contemporary jurisprudence suggests otherwise. 102 The Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-
Aventis US., LLC103 case is particularly instructive on the impact propor-
tionality principles can have on the discovery process. 
In Eisai, the court denied the plaintiffs request that the defendants 
produce ESI from over 200 company representatives. 104 The plaintiff had 
argued that production from these custodians was necessary to help estab-
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
99. See, e.g., Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445 (NPM/DEP), 
2011 WL 2154279, at *7, *13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011) (denying the plaintiffs motion to 
compel production based on minimal relevance, inaccessibility of the data, and cost, despite 
acknowledging that the multi-national corporate defendant could afford to produce the 
sought information). 
100. See, e.g., Kay Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Energy Brands, Inc., No. 07-C-1068, 2009 
WL 1649592, at *1, *3 (E.D. Wis. June 10, 2009) (denying the plaintiff's motion to compel 
for failing to justify with specific facts the $120,000 cost that the defendant would incur for 
producing five DVDs of stored ESI); Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Global Crossing Band-
width, Inc., 272 F.R.D. 350, 359 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting the defendant's undue burden 
argument given its failure to initially interpose objections in response to the written discov-
ery). 
101. This includes the Seventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit, the District of Maryland, 
the Northern District of California, and the District of New Jersey. See discussion infra Sec-
tion I.C. 
102. See Singer, supra note 43; Jablonski, supra note 3. 
103. Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2012 WL 1299379 
(D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012). 
104. /d. at * 1-2. 
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lish its antitrust claims against the defendants. 105 The court disagreed, hold-
ing that the requested discovery ran afoul of the proportionality rule. 106 As 
an initial matter, the court found that the discovery did not appear to elicit 
information that was relevant to the plaintiffs claims. 107 Moreover, the re-
quested discovery was unreasonably cumulative of the over 12 million pag-
es of documents that the defendants had already produced from seventy-five 
custodians. 108 Finally, given the marginal relevance of the requested materi-
als and that the defendants had already incurred over $10 million in discov-
ery costs, the court determined that the burdens and the projected expense of 
the discovery outweighed its likely benefits. 109 
The Eisai case teaches that the proportionality rule can meaningfully 
limit the cost and duration of discovery. 110 Just as the court in the Eisai case 
used the proportionality rule to curtail unnecessary discovery, savvy courts 
that are aware of the proportionality rule have done likewise over the past 
couple ofyears. 111 Moreover, several key principles are emerging from this 
developing body of proportionality jurisprudence. 112 These principles, to-
gether with the roadmap of best practices they provide, underscore the im-
portance of amending the Federal Rules to more clearly enshrine propor-
tionality as the defining principle of discovery practice. 
1. Parties' Efforts in Responding to Discovery Must Be Reasonable 
A key message from contemporary proportionality jurisprudence is 
that discovery responses must satisfy a standard of reasonableness, not per-
fection. 113 Such a standard, as taught in Larsen v. Coldwell Banker Real 
Estate Corp., protects entities from the costs and burdens of ensuring that 
eDiscovery efforts are flawless. 114 
I 05. !d. at *2. 
I 06. !d. at *7-1 0. 
107. /d. at *7. 
108. !d. 
109. !d. at *9. 
II 0. This was the third discovery motion filed by the plaintiff that the Eisai court 
denied on proportionality grounds. See Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 
(MLC), 2011 WL 5416334, at *I (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012); Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 
No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2011 WL 5416330, at *I (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011). 
Ill. See, e.g., Thermal Design, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg. Prods., No. 08-C-828, 2011 
WL 1527025, at *1-3 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2011) (denying plaintiff's motion to compel addi-
tional production as disproportionately expensive). 
112. See discussion infra Subsections II.B.I-5. 
113. This principle is akin to the axiom that perfection should not be the enemy of 
good. See VOLTAIRE, LA BEGUEULE 2 (1772) ("The perfect is the enemy of good."). 
114. Larsen v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp., No. SAVC 10-00401-AG 
(MLGx), 2012 WL 359466, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) ("To require Defendants to repeat 
this labor merely because Plaintiffs have identified a few alleged discrepancies in the ESI 
production is simply unreasonable."). 
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In Larsen, the court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the defend-
ants should be made to redo their production of documents. 115 The plaintiffs 
had argued that doing so was necessary to address certain discrepancies-
including missing emails, metadata, and mismatched file data. 116 The court 
was not persuaded. The plaintiffs had failed to establish that the discrepan-
cies prevented them from obtaining relevant information} 17 The court ex-
pressed particular concern that out of 9,000 pages of documents produced 
by the defendants, the plaintiffs had identified only a few alleged inadequa-
cies.118 
The court also reasoned that a "do over" would violate the principles 
of proportionality in Rule 26(b )(2)(C). 119 After reciting the operative propor-
tionality language from Rule 26, the court determined that "the burden and 
expense to Defendants in completely reproducing its entire ESI production 
far outweighs any possible benefit to Plaintiffs."120 Balanced against the 
time and money the defendants had invested on the production, there were 
simply too few discrepancies to justify the cost of redoing the production.121 
The Larsen decision reiterates to litigants that discovery efforts need 
only be reasonable and proportional, 122 and not perfect}23 Indeed, the Rules 
were never intended to exact perfection in the discovery process. 124 That 
misguided understanding of federal discovery practice has spawned too 
115. !d. (holding that "the burden and expense to Defendants in completely reproduc-
ing its entire ESI production far outweighs any possible benefit to Plaintiffs"). 
116. !d. at *6-8. 
117. !d. at *7 ("Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that Defend-
ants' preservation and production ofESI was inadequate."). 
118. !d. ("The few isolated examples cited by Plaintiffs (out of a document produc-
tion of approximately 9,000 pages) fail to demonstrate that Defendants have not reasonably 
and in good faith produced the documents required by this Court's October 25, 2011 Or-
der."). 
119. !d. 
120. !d. at *8. 
121. The defendants had already spent over I ,000 hours on that production alone at a 
cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. !d. 
122. Viet. Veterans of Am. v. CIA, No. 09 cv 0037 CW (JSC), 2011 WL 4635139, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011) (explaining that "[t]he rules of discovery are rooted in propor-
tionality and reasonableness"). 
123. See, e.g., MGA Entrn't, Inc. v. Nat'! Prods. Ltd., No. CV 10-07083 JAK (SSx), 
2011 WL 4550287, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (denying plaintiffs' motion to compel 
production of "documents that do not exist"). But see PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici 
Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNH/RFT), 2007 WL 2687670, at *8-12 (N.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 7, 2007) (requiring a re-do where relevant attachments were not produced after a soft-
ware glitch divorced them from their respective emails). 
124. DaSilva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL, No. 11 Civ. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 
WL 607412, at *II (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012) (explaining that "the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not require perfection"). 
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many expensive and futile eDiscovery sideshows. 125 Instead, discovery ef-
forts should be proportional to what is at stake in the litigation. Only then 
can the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action be real-
ized.126 
2. Unnecessary Discovery Requests Should Be Eliminated 
Bottoms v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston underscores the cor-
ollary principle of eliminating unnecessary discovery. 127 In Bottoms, the 
court drastically curtailed the written discovery that plaintiff sought to pro-
pound on the defendant. 128 Plaintiff had requested leave in this ERISA ac-
tion to serve "sweeping" interrogatories and document requests to resolve a 
very limited issue-whether the defendant had improperly denied her long 
term disability benefits. 129 Drawing on the proportionality standards under 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the court characterized the proposed discovery as "patent-
ly overbroad" and as seeking materials that were "largely irrelevant."130 The 
court ultimately ordered the defendant to respond to some aspects of the 
plaintiffs interrogatories and document demands, but not before curtailing 
their nature and scope. 131 
The Bottoms case emphasizes what the Advisory Committee spot-
lighted in the 1983 proportionality amendment: litigants should abandon 
unnecessary discovery .132 Consistent with Rule 26(g), this typically requires 
125. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 572 (D. Utah 2012) 
(denying plaintiffs' fourth motion for doomsday sanctions since evidence was destroyed 
pursuant to defendants' "good faith business procedures"); Leksi, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 129 
F.R.D. 99, I 05-06, 113 (D.N.J. 1989) (rejecting several of the plaintiffs "grossly dispropor-
tionate" interrogatories, which it feared would "give rise to a circus of peripheral litigation" 
and "spawn[] unbearable side litigation"); Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Propor-
tional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 
530-32 (2010) (arguing that the "broad and liberal" default scope of discovery leads to "over-
discovery," thereby pricing litigants out of court and breaking the civil justice system). 
126. FED. R. CIV. P. I; see, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 
4867346, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (framing Rule 26 within the Rule 1 mandate); Pettit 
v. Pulte Mortg., LLC, No. 2:11 cv 00149 GMN PAL, 2011 WL 5546422, at *5 (D. Nev. 
Nov. 14, 2011) (considering the goal of Rule I as the "prime directive" in evaluating discov-
ery). 
127. Bottoms v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., No. II cv 01606 PAB CBS, 
2011 WL 6181423, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2011). 
128. /d. at *8-10. 
129. /d. at *6 (seeking, among other things, the complete personnel files for every 
employee involved in the handling of the plaintiff's benefits claim). 
130. !d. at *9-1 0. 
131. /d. 
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note; see Mancia v. Mayflower Textile 
Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (D. Md. 2008); Philip Favro, Lessons Learned for 2012: 
Spotlighting the Top eDiscovery Cases from 2011, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 BLOG (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www .clearwellsystems.corn/e-discovery-blog/20 12/0 I /03/lessons-leamed-for-20 12-
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counsel to steer away from boilerplate demands or "robotically recycling" 
requests from previous lawsuits. 133 Instead, lawyers should "stop and think" 
about what discovery is actually needed and then prepare well-tailored re-
quests.134 For as Bottoms teaches, the obligation to ensure that discovery is 
both reasonable and proportional principally rests with lawyers and liti-
gants. 135 The failure to conduct discovery in this fashion could very well 
lead to sanctions against counsel and client, not to mention increased costs 
and delays attributable to "over-discovery" and resulting motion practice. 136 
3. Defensible Deletion of Electronically Stored Information Is 
Acceptable 
While courts are drawing on proportionality standards to discourage 
abusive tactics, they are simultaneously using the rule to acknowledge that 
organizations may defensibly delete ESI, especially for preservation pur-
poses.137 This means that an organization is free to implement good faith, 
reasonable data retention policies, which discard ESI not subject to a 
preservation duty. 138 For example, the court in E.I Du Pont De Nemours 
and Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc. refused to sanction the plaintiff manufac-
turer for eliminating emails pursuant to a good faith document retention 
policy .139 The defendant had argued that drastic sanctions should be imposed 
on the manufacturer since many of the deleted emails were allegedly rele-
spotlighting-the-top-ediscovery-cases-from-2011; Cecil Lynn III, 2011 The Year in Review, 
L. TECH. NEWS (Feb. 2012), http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/Lynn-2011-The-Year-in-
Review-Feb-2012.pdf ("Moreover, many courts emphasized the need for targeted, propor-
tional discovery, rather than broad demands that a party search its entire data and email sys-
tem for files, irrespective of cost."). 
133. Bottoms, 2011 WL 6181423, at *5. 
134. !d. 
135. !d. at *5, *8; see also FED. R. C!v. P. I advisory committee's note (requiring 
counsel to also bear the burdens of fulfilling the Rule I objectives). 
136. FED. R. C!v. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note. 
137. See also Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: Has the Rule 37(e) Safe 
Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 317 
(2010) (discussing the impact of the Federal Rule 37(e) "safe harbor" on defensible deletion 
ofESI). 
138. See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(approving corporate retention policies adopted for "good housekeeping" purposes). But see 
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. C 11 1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 3042943, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (issuing an adverse inference instruction to remedy the loss of relevant 
data stemming from the defendant's failure to suspend its email retention policy after the 
duty to preserve was triggered). 
139. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 3:09cv58, 2011 WL 
1597528, at *15 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2011). 
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vant to the defendant's counterclaims. 140 The court disagreed, finding in-
stead that the emails were overwritten pursuant to a reasonable data reten-
tion policy before the common law preservation duty was triggered. 141 
Rejecting the kaleidoscope of relevance as the sole touchstone of 
preservation, the court reasoned that preservation must be viewed through 
the lens of proportionality: 
"Thus, whether preservation or discovery conduct is acceptable in a case depends 
on what is reasonable, and that in turn depends on whether what was done-or not 
done-was proportional to that case and consistent with clearly established appli-
cable standards .... [A ]ssessment of reasonableness and proportionality should be 
at the forefront of all inquiries into whether a party has fulfilled its duty to pre-
serve relevant evidence."142 
Since the manufacturer was not reasonably aware of the nature of the 
defendant's counterclaims at the time the emails were destroyed, propor-
tionality standards tipped the scales against sanctioning the manufacturer for 
not preserving the ESI. 143 
The DuPont case reinforces the notion that a party's preservation ob-
ligations tum on proportionality and reasonableness. 144 In addition, it teach-
es organizations to develop and then follow reasonable retention policies 
that eliminate data stockpiles before litigation is reasonably anticipated. 145 It 
also demonstrates the value of deploying a timely and comprehensive litiga-
tion hold to ensure that relevant ESI is retained once a preservation duty 
arises. 146 By following these '"good faith business procedures,"' organiza-
140. /d. at *8 (seeking various evidentiary findings against the plaintiff manufacturer 
or, alternatively, an adverse inference instruction to the jury). 
141. /d. at *13, *15. 
142. /d. at *15 (alteration in original) (last emphasis added) (quoting Victor Stanley, 
Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 522-23 (D. Md. 2010)). 
143. /d. 
144. See Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining 
that "proportionality is necessarily a factor in ·determining a party's preservation obliga-
tions"); Grabenstein v. Arrow Elecs., Inc., No. 10 cv 02348 MSK KLM, 2012 WL 1388595, 
at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2012). 
145. See. e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2011 ); see also Matthew Nelson, Q&A with William P. Butterfield on His Testimony Regard-
ing the Costs and Burdens of eDiscovery Before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 BLOG (Dec. 22, 2011), 
www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-blog/20 11 I 12/22/qa-with-william-p-butterfield-on-
his-testimony-regarding-the-costs-and-burdens-of-ediscovery-before-the-house-judiciary-
committees-subcommittee-on-the-constitution ("A review of sanctions decisions demon-
strates that parties are not getting sanctioned where they acted in good faith. Rather, they are 
being sanctioned for egregious conduct."). 
146. See Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10 C 761,2011 WL 291077, at *4-5 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 27, 20 II) (denying sanctions motion since the defendant issued a timely litigation 
hold to preserve relevant documents once a preservation duty attached); cf E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 469, 507-10 (E.D. Va. 2011) (issuing 
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tions can establish a defensible information governance plan that is con-
sistent with principles of proportionality .147 
4. Cooperation Facilitates Effective Discovery 
Courts are also using proportionality principles to emphasize the im-
portance of cooperation in ensuring the ')ust, speedy and inexpensive de-
termination" of discovery. 148 The recent decision in Pippins v. KPMG ex-
emplifies this principle.149 
In Pippins, the court ordered the defendant accounting firm to pre-
serve thousands of employee hard drives. 150 The firm had argued that the 
high cost of preserving the drives was disproportionate to the value of the 
ESI stored on the drives. 151 Instead of preserving all of the drives, the firm 
hoped to maintain a reduced sample, asserting that the ESI on the sample 
drives would satisfy the evidentiary demands of the plaintiffs' class action 
claims. 152 
The court rejected the proportionality argument primarily because the 
firm refused to permit plaintiffs or the court to analyze the ESI found on the 
drives. 153 Without any transparency into the contents of the drives, the court 
could not weigh the benefits of the discovery against the alleged burdens of 
preservation. 154 The court was thus left to speculate about the nature of the 
ESI on the drives, reasoning that it went to the heart of plaintiffs' class ac-
tion claims. 155 As the district court observed, the firm may very well have 
obtained the relief it requested had it engaged in "good faith negotiations" 
with the plaintiffs over the preservation of the drives. 156 
an adverse inference jury instruction as a result of the defendant's failure to distribute a time-
ly and comprehensive litigation hold after its obligation ripened to retain relevant ESI). 
147. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 573 (D. Utah 2012) 
(quoting Lee v. Max Int'l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1321 (I Oth Cir. 2011 )). 
148. David J. Waxse, Cooperation-What Is It and Why Do It?, 18 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. I, 12 (2012); accord FED. R. C!v. P. 26(b)(l) advisory committee's note ("In general, 
it is hoped that reasonable lawyers can cooperate to manage discovery without the need for 
judicial intervention."). 
149. Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 WL 4701849 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff'd, 279 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
150. Pippins, 279 F.R.D. at 247-49. 
151. /d. at 250. 
152. /d. at 249-50. 
153. /d. at 252, 254 (reasoning that "[i]t smacks of chutzpah (no definition required) 
to argue that the Magistrate failed to balance the costs and benefits of preservation when 
KPMG refused to cooperate with that analysis by providing the very item that would, if 
examined, demonstrate whether there was any benefit at all to preservation"). 
154. /d. 
155. /d. at 254-56. 
156. /d. at 254. 
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The Pippins decision reinforces a common refrain that parties seeking 
the protection of proportionality principles must engage in reasonable, co-
operative discovery conduct. 157 Staking out uncooperative positions in the 
name of zealous advocacy stands in sharp contrast to proportionality stand-
ards and the cost cutting mandate of Rule 1. 158 Moreover, such a tactic may 
very well foreclose proportionality considerations, just as it did in Pip-
pins.l59 
5. Organizations Need an Information Governance Strategy 
Proportionality also encourages organizations to think ahead and de-
velop an effective information governance strategy, a point emphasized in 
Salamone v. Carter's Retail, Inc. 160 In Salamone, the defendant retailer filed 
a motion for a protective order to stave off the collection of thousands of 
personnel files. 161 The retailer argued that proportionality precluded the 
search and review of the personnel files. 162 In support of this argument, the 
retailer asserted that the nature, format, location, and organization of the 
records made their review and production too burdensome. 163 The retailer 
complained that it would have to review 130,000 pages of documents 
spread out across multiple offices and storage sites, which were lacking 
uniform records management procedures. 164 
In denying the motion, the court singled out the retailer's own infor-
mation retention system as the cause of the claimed disproportionate dis-
157. Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09 2120 ADM/JSM, 2011 WL 5025254, 
*5-6 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011) (foreclosing defendant's proportionality argument regarding 
the financial burdens of certain ordered discovery since those burdens were "self-inflicted" 
due to the defendant's failure to observe his preservation duties). 
158. Some commentators have argued that overaggressive positions are taken not 
because they are tactically sound, but because attorneys believe that their clients expect such 
tactics. See Gensler, supra note 64, at 540. Nevertheless, clients could be on the hook for 
sanctions or increased discovery burdens as a result of such conduct. /d. 
159. It should be noted that the firm's initial motion for protective order was denied 
without prejudice to allow the firm to negotiate a cooperative preservation arrangement 
regarding the drives with the plaintiffs. Pippins, 279 F.R.D. at 252. The defendant was none-
theless unable to do so, which ultimately led the district court to conclude that the firm was 
"hoist on its own petard." /d. at 256. 
160. See Salamone v. Carter's Retail, Inc., No. 09-5856 (GEB), 2011 WL 310701, at 
* 12 (D.N .J. Jan. 28, 20 II). 
161. !d. at *1. 
162. /d. at *5. 
163. /d. at *6 (citing Byrd v. PECO Energy Co., No. CIV. A. 97-7892, 1999 WL 
89711, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 1999)) (relying on authority the court ultimately distin-
guished, which involved a large company with many employees that staved off an additional 
production of documents on proportionality grounds). 
164. /d. at *6-7. 
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covery burden. 165 That the retailer, the court reasoned, "maintains personnel 
files in several locations without any uniform organizational method does 
not exempt Defendant from reasonable discovery obligations."166 After 
weighing the various factors that comprise the proportionality analysis un-
der Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the court concluded that the probative value of pro-
duction outweighed the resulting burden and expense on the retailer. 167 
Having an intelligent information governance plan in place could have 
addressed the cost and logistics headaches that the retailer faced. Had the 
records at issue been digitized and maintained in a central archive, the re-
tailer's collection burdens would have been significantly minimized. 168 Fur-
thermore, integrating these "upstream" data retention protocols with "down-
stream" eDiscovery processes could have expedited the review process.169 
The Salamone case teaches that an integrated information governance pro-
cess, supported by effective, enabling technologies, will likely help organi-
zations realize the benefits of proportionality principles. 
6. The Widespread Need for Proportionality 
The aforementioned decisions amply justify the need for more fre-
quent and widespread use of proportionality standards in federal discovery 
practice. They also illustrate best practices which, if followed, will help 
lawyers and litigants reduce the costs and burdens of eDiscovery. Grounded 
in proportional discovery, these cases suggest that real progress can be 
made toward achieving the tripartite aims of Rule 1. 
C. The Role of Pilot Programs, Model Orders, and Local Rules Emphasiz-
ing Proportionality 
Having observed the benefits of proportionality as reflected in the 
above referenced cases, certain courts have adopted local rules to emphasize 
the role of proportionality in managing litigation costs. 170 This Section pro-
vides a brief overview of the measures specific circuit and district courts 
165. !d. at *12. 
166. !d. 
167. !d. 
168. SYMANTEC, supra note 4, at 14 ("By taking a proactive approach to information 
retention and eDiscovery, top-tier organizations see ... important benefits .... [I]t allows 
them to save time and money gained by responding more quickly to eDiscovery demands. 
Respondents using best practices reported a 64 percent faster response time with a 2.3 times 
higher success rate when responding to eDiscovery requests."). 
169. See Nuffer & Favro, supra note 27. 
170. David Canfield, An Overview of State £-Discovery Rules, INSIDE COUNS. (Mar. 
15, 20 12), http://www.insidecounsel.com/20 12/03/15/an-overview-of-state-e-discovery-rules 
("[T]he time is ripe to consider the role of states in e-discovery rule development-resilient 
adopters or trail-blazing innovators--Qr perhaps a bit of both?"). 
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have taken to implement the proportionality rule in their jurisdictions. We 
lead off with a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's eDiscovery Pilot Pro-
gram, which emphasizes proportionality as a discovery hallmark. 171 Next, 
we consider the elements of proportionality inherent in the Model eDiscov-
ery Order recently promulgated by the Federal Circuit. 172 We then discuss 
the relevant local rules and practices regarding proportionality adopted by 
federal district courts in Maryland, California, and New Jersey. 173 Finally, 
we address the impact of these grassroots efforts on developing proposed 
amendments to the Federal Rules. 174 
1. The Seventh Circuit eDiscovery Pilot Program 
The Seventh Circuit launched the nation's first eDiscovery Pilot Pro-
gram (Program) in 2009 with the express goal of encouraging proportionali-
ty in discovery. 175 To ensure compliance with proportionality standards, the 
Program directs litigants to consider the limitations of Federal Rule 
26(b )(2)(C) when preparing a discovery plan. 176 In addition, parties are di-
rected to propound requests and responses that are "reasonably targeted, 
clear, and as specific as practicable."177 
Preservation, however, is where the Program really emphasizes the 
importance of proportionality. 178 The parties are urged to work together at 
the outset and during the case to ensure that preservation efforts are "rea-
sonable and proportionate."179 This includes cooperative efforts to limit 
"discovery about discovery," which can "contribute to the unnecessary ex-
pense and delay" in litigation. 180 To that end, any disputes over preservation 
must be thoroughly vetted during the meet and confer process, and gov-
erned by the standards set forth in the proportionality rule. 181 Finally, in an 
effort to avoid needless wrangling over inaccessible data, the Program goes 
beyond Rule 26(b )(2)(B) and delineates specific categories of ESI' 82 that 
171. See infra Subsection I.C.l. 
172. See infra Subsection I.C.2. 
173. See infra Subsection I.C.3. 
174. See infra Section I. D. 
175. 7TH CIR. ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY OF 
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, at princs. l.Ol-.03 (2010), available at 
http://www .discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/Principles8 _I O.pdf. 
176. !d. at princ. 1.03. 
177. !d. 
178. /d. at princ. 2.04 (Scope of Preservation). 
179. !d. at princ. 2.04(a). 
180. !d. at princ. 2.04(b ). 
181. /d. at princ. 2.04( e). 
182. Such ESI includes: 
(I) "deleted," "slack," "fragmented," or "unallocated" data on hard drives; (2) ran-
dom access memory (RAM) or other ephemeral data; (3) on-line access data such 
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"are not discoverable in most cases."183 Any effort to obtain discovery of 
those categories of ESI must be rigorously analyzed through the lens of 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C). 184 
With proportionality as one of the primary objectives of the Program, 
this top-down approach has successfully impacted discovery practices 
throughout the Seventh Circuit. 185 Sixty-seven percent of litigants surveyed 
agreed that the proportionality rule played a significant role in the develop-
ment of their discovery plans. 186 Perhaps as a direct result, 85% of judges 
who participated in the Program reported a corresponding decrease in the 
number of discovery disputes they were asked to resolve. 187 
These reported results are precisely the type of empirical data that 
demonstrates how proportionality can achieve real cost savings in eDiscov-
ery.188 Such results, however, are derived from a framework applicable only 
in the Seventh Circuit. 189 While other geographic circuits may develop 
similar concepts, 190 there is still nothing that resembles the Program else-
where. For the time being, the Program's efforts to emphasize proportionali-
ty remain confined to the district courts located in Illinois, Wisconsin, and 
Indiana. 
2. The Federal Circuit's Model eDiscovery Order 
Another laudable, "localized" effort to more effectively implement 
proportionality has been undertaken through the Federal Circuit's Model 
as temporary internet files, history, cache, cookies, etc.; (4) data in metadata fields 
that are frequently updated automatically, such as last-opened dates; (5) backup da-
ta that is substantially duplicative of data that is more accessible elsewhere; and (6) 
other forms of ESI whose preservation requires extraordinary affirmative measures 
that are not utilized in the ordinary course of business. 
!d. at princ. 2.04(d). 
183. !d. 
184. !d. at princ. 2.04( e). 
185. !d. at princ. 1.03. The other principal drivers are cooperation and the Rule I 
mandate. See id. at princs. 1.01-.02. 
186. SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT ON 
PHASE Two 58 (2012), available at http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/Phase-
Two-Final-Report-Appendix.pdf. 
187. !d. at 68. 
188. See Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 17, 2010) (directing the parties to observe the Program's guidelines that discovery be 
conducted in reasonable and proportional manner). 
189. Allison Walton, 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program and the Princi-
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eDiscovery Order (Order, Model Order). 191 Released in the fall of2011, the 
Model Order specifically seeks to reduce the cost of discovery in patent 
litigation. 192 Yet the Order also has the more ambitious agenda of improving 
the entire U.S. civil litigation system. 193 
The Model Order emphasizes proportionality standards and compli-
ance with the tripartite purposes of Rule 1 through cost-shifting. 194 More 
specifically, cost-shifting is imposed for disproportionate ESI discovery, 
particularly for over-discovery of email. 195 Given the high costs associated 
with the production of email196 and the infrequent use of such evidence at 
trial, 197 the Order places sweeping restrictions on its discovery. As an initial 
matter, the Order provides for the phasing of discovery to ensure that core 
patent documentation is exchanged before email productions can occur. 198 
When email productions are finally permitted, such discovery is limited as a 
matter of right to a few custodians with targeted search terms. 199 
Given its recent origin, it remains to be seen whether the Order will 
have the desired impact on patent litigation.200 Nevertheless, it does have the 
potential to influence leading lawyers and litigants given the number of high 
profile201 and heavy traffic districts that participate in the Federal Circuit's 
companion pilot program. 202 
191. See MODEL ORDER, supra note 11. 
192. RADER, supra note 5. The Order is derived from Chief Judge Randall Rader's 
recent "State of Patent Litigation" address. /d. 
193. Mark Michels, The Patent Pilot Program Sets Sail, CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 27, 
20 12), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsei/PubArticleCC.jsp?id= 1202541860803& 
The_Patent_Pilot_Program_Sets_Sail. 
194. MODEL ORDER, supra note II, nos. I, 3. 
195. !d. nos. 3-4. It furthermore recognizes and rewards meaningful attempts at com-
pliance. !d. no. 4. 
196. See, e.g., Thermal Design, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg. Prods., No. 08-C-828, 2011 
WL 1527025, at *I, *3 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2011) (denying the plaintiff's motion to compel 
discovery of emails given the exorbitant production costs and the lack of good cause). 
197. RADER, supra note 5, at 8 ("I saw one analysis that concluded that .0074% of the 
documents produced actually made their way onto the trial exhibit list .... [F]or all the 
thousands of appeals I've evaluated, email appears even more rarely as relevant evidence."). 
198. DCG Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Technologies, LLC, No. C-11-03792 PSG, 2011 
WL 5244356, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (interpreting and applying the Model Order 
rules regarding email). 
199. MODEL ORDER, supra note II, nos. 9-11. 
200. See Peter Zura, Report: District Courts with the Most Patent Filings 2009, 271 
PAT. BLOG (Jan. 20, 2010, 12:34 PM), http://271patent.blogspot.com/2010/01/report-district-
courts-with-most-patent.html. 
201. The Northern District of California has hosted two recent headline grabbing 
lawsuits: Oracle America, Inc. v. Coogle Inc. (regarding allegations of copyright and patent 
infringement regarding aspects of Java; heard in the Northern District of California by Judge 
William Alsup) and Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (regarding alleged infringement 
of smartphone and tablet computer patents; heard in the Northern District of California by 
Judge Lucy Koh). See Oracle America, Inc. v. Coogle Inc., U.S. D. CT., N.D. CAL., 
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By way of example, in DCG Systems, Inc. v. Checkpoint Technolo-
gies, LLC, a federal magistrate from the Northern District of California di-
rected that the Model Order be used in that case to restrain the amount of 
email discovery.203 Entered over the objections of the plaintiff, the court 
cited the need for the Model Order's strictures to guard against dispropor-
tionate discovery.204 While conceding that the Order's limits may ultimately 
be unnecessary, the court reasoned they should be imposed "to address what 
has to date been a largely unchecked problem."205 
Both the DCG case and the Model Order highlight the drastic 
measures that certain courts will take to address the problem of dispropor-
tionate discovery.206 They also underscore the need for emphasizing compli-
ance with the proportionality rule. Yet there is no certainty at this time that 
the Model Order's restrictive approach for implementing proportionality 
will be successful in patent disputes or more generally in federal discovery 
practice. 
3. District Courts That Have Implemented Local Proportionality Rules 
The foregoing efforts to draw attention to the proportionality rule are 
not just limited to circuit courts. District courts have also developed local 
rules to better emphasize proportionality. This Subsection provides a brief 
overview of these local rules and practices. It also highlights some of the 
decisions from those districts dealing with proportionality. Finally, we call 
attention to provisions that might be useful in a proposed amendment to 
Rule 26. 
http://cand.uscourts.gov/wha/oraclevgoogle (last visited Nov. 20, 2012); Apple Inc. v. Sam-
sung Electronics Co., Ltd., U.S. D. CT., N.D. CAL., 
http://cand.uscourts.gov/lhk/applevsamsung (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
202. Karen Redmond, District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, U.S. 
COURTS (June 7, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/newsview/ll-06-
07 /District_ Courts_ Selected_ for _Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx. Key patent-heavy district 
courts include: Central District of California, Northern District of California, and Eastern 
District of Texas. Craig Anderson, Central District Struggles in Its Role as Top Patent Ven-
ue, DAILY J. (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/4/9/4940/ DailyJour-
nal_MScarsi_ 4710.pdf. 
203. DCG Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 5244356, at *2. 
204. !d.; see also RADER, supra note 5, at 8. 
205. DCG Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 5244356, at *2. But see Ralph Losey, Good, Better, 
Best: A Tale of Three Proportionality Cases-Part Two, E-DISCOVERY TEAM (Apr. 15, 2012, 
4:40 PM), http://e-discoverytearn.com/20 12/04/15/good-better-best-a-tale-of-three-
proportionality-cases-part-two (criticizing the DCG court's approach to keyword searching 
while praising its efforts to promulgate proportionality). 
206. See In re Google Litig., No. C 08-03172 RMW (PSG), 2011 WL 6113000, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2011) (applying aspects ofthe Model Order to protect a non-party from 
unduly burdensome document requests propounded under a Rule 45 subpoena). 
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a. The District of Maryland 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland has stood 
apart as a pioneering leader in discovery reform for a number of years. 207 
The court has developed several local resources to help guide parties' ef-
forts, especially in the realm of eDiscovery. These resources include an 
eleven page set of "Discovery Guidelines" attached to the court's local 
rules208 and a twenty-eight page "Suggested Protocol for Discovery of Elec-
tronically Stored Information" (Discovery Protocol).209 At least one jurist 
has even published a four page set of "Discovery Procedures" regarding 
discovery practice in his courtroom.210 
As a general theme, these local court materials emphasize the im-
portance of proportionality, cooperation, and reasonableness in accomplish-
ing the objectives of Rule 1.211 What is most striking, however, is that the 
court unequivocally conditions the permissible scope of discovery on pro-
portionality standards: "Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 requires that discovery be rele-
vant to any party's claim or defense; proportional to what is at issue in a 
case; and not excessively burdensome or expensive as compared to the like-
207. Marcus, supra note 7, at 321 ("Maryland has leading examples of two other 
sources of direction on e-discovery---district court guidance and state court rulemaking ... 
. ").Maryland's "Suggested Protocol for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information" has 
been in effect since 2007. See Suggested Protocol for Discovery of Electronically Stored 
Information ("ESI''), U.S. D. CT., D. Mo., 
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/esiprotocol.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 20 12) [here-
inafter Protocol]. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's Program was initiated in 2009 and the 
Federal Circuit's Model Order in 2011. See 7TH CIR. ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., supra note 
175; MODEL ORDER, supra note II. 
208. D. MD. LOCAL R. APP. A, available at 
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/localrules/Jocalrules.pdf. 
209. Protocol, supra note 207. 
210. Anderson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. WDQ-1 1-1188, 2011 WL 
4828891, at *3-6 (D. Md. Oct. I 1, 2011). These local rules are required reading for counsel 
who appear before that particular jurist, U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm. !d. at *2 
("Counsel should familiarize themselves with (1) this Court's Discovery Guidelines, paying 
particular attention to Guideline 1; (2) the attached Discovery Procedures that I use for cases 
assigned to me, which modify the Court's Local Rules; and (3) Mancia v. Mayflower Textile 
Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008)."). Judge Grimm is one of the most visible jurists 
to comment on discovery. Apart from several Jaw review articles, he has co-authored a book 
on discovery and teaches a discovery class at the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
Chief Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm, U.S. D. CT., D. Mo., 
www.mdd.uscourts.gov/publications/JudgesBio/grimm.htrn (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
21 I. The express purpose of the Protocol "is to facilitate the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive conduct of discovery involving ESI." Protocol, supra note 207, para. I. This senti-
ment is repeated in the local rules: "The purpose of these Guidelines is to facilitate the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive conduct of discovery." D. Mo. LOCAL R. APP. A, at Guideline I .a; cf 
FED. R. CIV. P. I. 
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ly benefit of obtaining the discovery being sought."212 This statement is set 
forth in the opening paragraph of the Discovery Guidelines, confirming that 
proportionality is the touchstone of discovery in the District of Maryland. 
Another prominent feature of these local discovery resources is the 
importance the court places on the Rule 26(g) certification requirement.213 
Like the proportionality rule itself, the certification requirement is promi-
nently featured in the first Discovery Guideline.214 The rules leave no doubt 
that counsel are expected to comply with the certification requirement: 
"[C]ounsel and parties are expected to be familiar with the requirements of 
the Rule."215 
In a further attempt to direct the parties to engage in proportional dis-
covery, the court painstakingly details various cooperative efforts the parties 
should take to develop an effective discovery plan.216 This includes using 
the Rule 26(f) conference to consider the estimated costs and burdens of 
reviewing potentially relevant ESI.217 The parties are also directed to phase 
their document productions to ensure that the proverbial "low hanging fruit" 
of accessible ESI is first produced before efforts are made to discover ESI 
that is not reasonably accessible.218 Finally, parties are again instructed to 
make their document productions consistent with Rule 26(b)(2)(C).219 
As a result of Maryland's early embrace of eDiscovery and the em-
phasis its jurists have placed on proportionality,220 the court has developed a 
robust jurisprudence that supports the objectives of its local discovery 
rules.221 Indeed, many of the leading cases222 and scholarship on proportion-
212. D. MD. LOCAL R. APP. A, at Guideline l.a(emphasis added). 
213. Id. at Guideline I.e. 
214. !d. at Guideline I.a. 
215. !d. at Guideline I.e. 
216. Cecil Lynn III, Maryland District Court Establishes Suggested Protocol for£-
Discovery, DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE (Apr. I, 2007), 
http://www .lexisnexis.corn/applieddiscovery/N ewsEvents/PDFs/200704 _ BNA _Maryland. pd 
f. 
217. Protocol, supra note 207, para. 8(H), (K). 
218. Id. para. 8(M). 
219. Id. 
220. See An Interview with Judge Paul Grimm, Chief United States Magistrate Judge, 
DISCOVERY BRAIN (Oct. 18, 2011), discoverybrain.corn/interview/an-interview-with-judge-
paul-grimm-chief-united-states-magistrate-judge-1-of-3. 
221. See, e.g., Anderson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. WDQ-11-1188, 2011 
WL 4828891 (D. Md. Oct. II, 2011); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 
497 (D. Md. 2010); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008). 
222. For example, the Mancia v. Mayflower case alone is cited to by at least forty-
three other decisions and 126 secondary sources. KeyCite, WESTLAWNEXT, 
http://next.westlaw.com (search 253 F.R.D. 354; then follow "Citing References" tab) (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2012); Dean Gonsowski, Top 5 Cases that Shaped Electronic Discovery in 
2008, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 BLOG (Dec. 12, 2008), www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-
blog/2008/12/ 12/top-5-cases-that-shaped-electronic-discovery-in-2008. 
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ality originate from the district.223 Perhaps the most noteworthy proportion-
ality case in the country-Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co. -was 
issued from the District of Maryland in 2008.224 
In Mancia, the court used a fairly routine discovery dispute to spot-
light proportionality principles.225 The parties had reached an impasse re-
garding the defendants' responses to several written discovery requests.226 In 
response to the plaintiffs' motions to compel, the court highlighted the im-
portance of the Rule 26(g) certification requirement in reducing abusive 
discovery practices.227 After meticulously reviewing the Rule's purpose and 
its interplay with the proportionality rule,228 the court declined to render a 
decision on the pending motions.229 Instead, the parties were directed to co-
operatively meet and confer by following the same guidelines delineated 
above from the local discovery resources.230 
The Mancia case is generally considered required reading for every 
lawyer that practices in the District of Maryland.231 It is not the only case 
from the District used as a vehicle for educating lawyers and litigants about 
the virtues ofproportionality.232 The court in Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative 
Pipe, Inc. discussed at length the role that the proportionality rule could 
play in limiting costs associated with ESI preservation.233 And in Anderson 
223. See generally Carroll, supra note 1; Marcus, supra note 7; Grimm et al., supra 
note 34. 
224. Mancia, 253 F.R.D. 354. But see In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 108 
F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (emphasizing that the 1983 proportionality amendments 
had substantially altered the calculus of liberal discovery under the Federal Rules). 
225. Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357-62. 
226. /d. at 355-57. 
227. /d. at 357 ("If primary responsibility for conducting discovery is to continue to 
rest with the litigants, they must be obliged to act responsibly and avoid abuse."). 
228. !d. at 358-63. 
229. /d. at 364-66. 
230. /d. 
231. Anderson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. WDQ-11-1188, 20 II WL 
4828891, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. II, 2011). Judge Grimm's own "Discovery Procedures" are 
attached to Anderson. /d. at *3. The "Discovery Procedures" incorporate and reinforce the 
Guidelines, the Protocol, and Mancia. D. Mo. LOCAL R. APP. A; Protocol, supra note 207; 
Mancia, 253 F.R.D. 354. 
232. Monica Bay, Paul Grimm: The Ultimate Answer to £-Discovery Conflict May 
Lie with the Next Generation of Lawyers, L. TECH. NEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews!PubArticleL TN.jsp?id= 12024 79175208&slretu 
m=20121018174516 ("As he did in Mancia v. Mayflower, Grimm used the original Victor 
Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe ruling to educate an audience far wider than the litigants." 
(citation omitted)). 
233. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010) 
("[W]ith few exceptions ... courts have tended to overlook the importance of proportionality 
in determining whether a party has complied with its duty to preserve evidence in a particular 
case[;] this should not be the case because Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) cautions that all per-
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v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the court again used a common 
discovery motion to educate the parties and their counsel on the importance 
of conducting focused, proportional discovery.234 
The Mancia, Victor Stanley, and Anderson decisions represent a grow-
ing body of uniform case law requiring parties to conduct discovery con-
sistent with the proportionality rule. That the District of Maryland has been 
successful in doing so is directly attributable to its local discovery re-
sources, which unequivocally and obviously require compliance with pro-
portionality.235 Some aspects of Maryland's local eDiscovery rules may ac-
cordingly be worth replicating in amendments to the Federal Rules. 
Any such amendments, however, must be simple and straightforward 
to ensure successful implementation. While a local jurisdiction perhaps has 
the luxury of promulgating voluminous procedures and practices, the Feder-
al Rules cannot be cluttered with forty-three additional pages of rules and 
requirements surrounding this issue. A proposed change to the proportional-
ity rule would have to be more concise. 
b. The Northern District of California 
Unlike the District of Maryland, the Northern District of California· 
(NDCA) does not have an elaborate and comprehensive set of rules to en-
courage litigants to engage in proportional discovery.236 Instead, the NDCA 
extends the Rule 26(g) attorney certification requirement by local rule into 
discovery motion practice.237 Under NDCA Local Rule 37-2, the moving 
missible discovery must be measured against the yardstick of proportionality." (emphasis 
added)). 
234. Anderson, 20 II WL 4828891, at *3-4 (assigning counsel a discovery reading list 
including the Federal Rules, the Local Rules, Appendix A to the Local Rules, the Protocol, 
and the Mancia case, as well as laying out proportionality and cooperation principles). 
235. "Fed R. Civ. P. 26 requires that discovery be relevant to any party's claim or 
defense; proportional to what is at issue in a case; and not excessively burdensome or expen-
sive as compared to the likely benefit of obtaining the discovery being sought." D. MD. 
LOCAL R. APP. A, at Guideline I.a. The Protocol, although never expressly mentioning "pro-
portionality," directs counsel to cooperatively discuss "the nature of the claim, the amount in 
controversy, agreements of the parties, the relative ability of the parties to conduct discovery 
of ESI, and such other factors as may be relevant," which are, in essence, the components of 
proportionality. Protocol, supra note 207, para. I. 
236. At the time this Article went to print, the Northern District of California promul-
gated a more detailed framework for addressing proportionality in its local rules. That 
framework, entitled "Guidelines Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Infor-
mation," emphasizes the role of proportionality in addressing the costs and burdens of eDis-
covery. See N.D. CAL., GUIDELINES FOR THE DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED 
INFORMATION 1.03, 2.01-2.02 (2012), available at 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/1117/ESI _ Guidelines.pdf. 
237. "For each such [motion to compel], the moving papers must detail the basis for 
the party's contention that it is entitled to the requested discovery and must show how the 
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party must demonstrate that the requested discovery satisfies proportionality 
principles and any other applicable elements of Federal Rule 26(b)(2) when 
pursuing a motion to compel.238 
Such a certification requirement, absent from the present iteration of 
Federal Rule 37,239 has been helpful in making litigants in the NDCA ob-
serve proportionality standards.24° For example, in Vietnam Veterans of 
America v. Centra/Intelligence Agency, the court highlighted the plaintiffs' 
failure to comply with the proportionality rule as the basis for denying cer-
tain discovery and limiting the breadth of other requests. 241 Particularly 
troublesome to the court was the plaintiffs' failure to first review the de-
fendants' existing productions, which raised the question of whether the 
additional discovery was cumulative or duplicative of the one million plus 
pages of documents the defendants already produced.242 Given these cir-
cumstances, the plaintiffs' request for "limitless additional discovery at sig-
nificant cost" failed the proportionality test and Local Rule 37-2.243 
The Vietnam Veterans decision is one of many opinions from the 
NDCA that have applied the local certification requirement to emphasize 
the importance of proportionality. 244 
Another such case is Plascencia v. BNC Mortgage, Inc., in which the 
court concluded that several discovery requests were disproportionate since 
they were "too broad, ill-defined, and not fine-tuned."245 And in Crossbow 
Technology, Inc. v. YH Techno/ogy,246 the court pointedly reminded the de-
fendant to comply with Local Rule 37-2 if it decided to pursue further mo-
tion practice. 247 
As the above cases demonstrate, the NDCA certification requirement 
is bringing needed emphasis to the proportionality rule. Such a proportional-
proportionality and other requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) are satisfied." N.D. CAL. 
Clv. LOCAL R. 37-2, available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/civii#MTC. 
238. /d. 
239. FED. R. Clv. P. 37. 
240. Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, No. 09 cv 0037 CW (JSC), 
2011 WL 4635139 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011). 
241. /d. at *4, *7, *14. 
242. !d. at *3. 
243. See id. 
244. See, e.g., Plascencia v. BNC Mortg., Inc. (In re Plascencia), No. 08-56305-
ASW, 2012 WL 2161412, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 12, 2012) (finding that Local Rule 
37-2 applied in the discovery phase of an adversary proceeding of a bankruptcy action); 
Crossbow Tech., Inc. v. YH Tech., No. C-03-04360 SI (EDL), 2007 WL 926876, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 26, 2007). 
245. Plascencia, 2012 WL 2161412, at *II. 
246. Crossbow Tech., 2007 WL 926876, at *1 (denying without prejudice the defend-
ant's motion to compel given the failure of both parties to meaningfully engage in the meet 
and confer process). 
247. /d. at *2. 
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ity certification would be a welcome addition to Federal Rule 37 for at least 
two reasons. First, a Rule 37 certification would provide litigants with an 
additional warning beyond Rule 26 of their obligation to engage in propor-
tional discovery. Second, a certification would remind courts and counsel 
that consistent with Rule 26(g), the party seeking discovery always has the 
burden of showing that it satisfies the proportionality rule. 
c. The District ofNew Jersey 
Unlike the District of Maryland and the NDCA, the District of New 
Jersey has not taken any formal effort to promulgate local rules that spot-
light aspects of the proportionality rule. Instead, New Jersey has developed 
a rich body of case law that emphasizes proportional discovery. The Eisai v. 
Sanofi-Aventis248 and Salamone v. Carter's RetaiP49 decisions, respectively 
discussed in Part J/50 are quintessential examples of the importance New 
Jersey has placed on the proportionality rule. 
These and other proportionality cases251 from New Jersey generally re-
ly on three earlier opinions, 252 all of which established proportionality as the 
benchmark for curtailing overly broad discovery. The first of these opin-
ions, Leksi, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Company,253 issued in 1989, was vi-
sionary in its use of the then-extant proportionality provisions of Rule 26.254 
The Leksi court reasoned that the "1983 amendment to Rule 26(b)(l)" tem-
pered the importance of relevance and "emphasized that discovery must be 
proportional ... [and] tailored to the case at hand."255 Relying on that ra-
tionale, the court both limited and rejected several of the plaintiff's "grossly 
disproportionate" interrogatories. 256 Had it not done so, the court expressed 
grave concern that such discovery would spawn a "circus" of collateral liti-
gation.257 
248. Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2012 WL 1299379 
(D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012). 
249. Salamone v. Carter's Retail, Inc., No. 09-5856 (GEB), 2011 WL 310701 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 28, 2011 ). 
250. See discussion supra Section I.B, Subsection I.B.5. 
251. See, e.g., Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., No. 
10-4126 (PGS), 2012 WL 1623870, at *22-25 (D.N.J. May 9, 2012) (finding that the defend-
ant satisfied the proportionality rule by demonstrating the relevance of the requested docu-
ments and that their production would not be unduly burdensome). 
252. Bowers v. NCAA, No. 97-2600 (JBS), 2008 WL 1757929, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Feb. 
27, 2008); Pub. Serv. Enter. Grp. Inc. v. Phila. Electric Co., 130 F.R.D. 543, 551 (D.N.J. 
1990); Leksi, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 99, 105 (D.N.J. 1989). 
253. Leksi, 129 F.R.D. 99. 
254. /d. at 105. 
255. /d. 
256. /d. at 113. 
257. /d. at 105-06, 113. 
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The second258 and third259 of these seminal New Jersey cases further 
substantiate the proportionality principles emphasized in Leksi. In Public 
Service Enterprise Group Inc. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., the court held 
that several of the defendant's interrogatories violated the proportionality 
rule because the requested information was already in the defendant's pos-
session, was available from public sources, and was in any event marginally 
relevant to the litigation.260 And in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, the court denied the plaintiffs motion to compel production of 
a Rule 30(b)(6) witness and related documents given the nominal relevance 
of the discovery and the plaintiffs ample opportunity to obtain the infor-
mation previously.261 
The Leksi, Public Service, and Bowers cases all confirm the long 
standing and consistent nature of New Jersey's proportionality jurispru-
dence. Yet despite the success of this approach in New Jersey, it has not 
proven successful in most of the rest of the country. Indeed, delineating the 
contours of proportionality on a case-by-case basis has so far been ineffec-
tive in creating a national proportionality rule that is clear and enforceable. 
D. Analysis of the Limitations of the Current Rules Regime 
I. The Rules as Drafted Are Fatally Flawed 
Clearly, the proportionality rule in Federal Rule 26 has the potential to 
reduce the onerous costs and burdens of eDiscovery. Indeed, recent juris-
prudence, together with the grassroots efforts of circuit and district courts, 
demonstrate that proportionality should be the touchstone of federal discov-
ery. Yet without an amendment, this is unlikely to occur nationwide. 
As detailed throughout this Article, the proportionality regime from 
the Federal Rules has failed to emerge as a meaningful standard. First and 
most importantly, the current rule fails to state with sufficient clarity that 
proportionality is the standard upon which discovery is predicated. Unless 
all parties concerned are placed on notice with an unequivocal statement 
that discovery is to be proportional, many courts and counsel will likely 
stick to the view that there are few bounds to liberal federal discovery.262 
Such a mistaken notion has engendered the second problem with the 
current proportionality framework. The Rule 26(g) certification requirement 
258. Pub. Serv. Enter. Grp. Inc. v. Phila. Electric Co., 130 F.R.D. 543,551-52 (D.N.J. 
1990). 
259. Bowers v. NCAA, No. 97-2600 (JBS), 2008 WL 1757929, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 
2008). 
260. Pub. Serv. Enter. Grp. Inc., 130 F.R.D. at 551-52. 
261. Bowers, 2008 WL 1757929, at *4-6. 
262. Hedges, supra note 43, at 5-6 (observing that the proportionality rule "may be 
the most underutilized of the [Federal] Rules"). 
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remains largely forgotten.263 Indeed, many lawyers and judges have no idea 
that a certification requirement specific to discovery exists outside of Feder-
al Rule 11. This lack of understanding, coupled with the failure to conduct 
discovery consistent with the aims of Rule 26(g), is one of the principal 
reasons why discovery expenses are vaulting into the stratosphere. 264 
A third and critical problem with the current Rule 26 is essentially an 
outgrowth of the neglected certification requirement, as well as a quirk of 
the Rules. Rule 26(g) clearly requires the requesting party to bear the bur-
den of preparing proportional discovery.265 Confusingly, however, Rule 
26( c) forces a responding party to bear the burden of defeating dispropor-
tionate discovery by filing a motion for a protective order.266 As a result, 
Rule 26( c) unfairly shifts to the responding party the affirmative obligation 
that Rule 26(g) imposes on the requesting party to prepare proportional dis-
covery. The Dongguk University v. Yale University case is particularly in-
structive on this issue.267 
In Dongguk, the plaintiff filed a motion for protective order to quash 
several categories of questioning under a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.268 The 
plaintiff had argued that the objectionable topics were unreasonably cumu-
lative and duplicative of other discovery the defendant had already ob-
tained.269 Though it eventually sided with the plaintiff as to several of the 
categories in question, the court nonetheless held that the plaintiff had the 
burden of proof since it was the moving party under Rule 26(c).270 Nowhere 
in its analysis of the Rule 26 proportionality rule did the court recognize that 
the defendant, as the party seeking the deposition, had the burden of estab-
lishing that the discovery was proportional. 271 
Contrary to the Dongguk holding, the responding party should not be 
obligated to first show that the requested discovery is disproportionate. Such 
burden shifting inappropriately relieves the demanding party of its Rule 
26(g) obligation to prepare cogent and concise discovery requests.272 Indeed, 
unless the Rule 26(g) "stop and think" mandate273 is observed, Justice Rob-
263. See Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 356-57 (D. Md. 
2008). 
264. See id. at 359. 
265. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(l)(B)(ii)-(iii). 
266. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 270 F.R.D. 70, 72 (D. 
Conn. 2010). 
267. Dongguk Univ., 270 F.R.D. 70. 
268. !d. at 72. 
269. !d. 
270. ld. at 74. 
271. ld. at 73. 
272. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(l)(B)(ii)-(iii). 
273. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note. 
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ert Jackson's famous declaration will continue unfulfilled since counsel will 
continue to engage in discovery "without wits."274 
2. Local Efforts Cannot Adequately Address the Rules' Deficiencies 
These fatal flaws cannot be properly solved through the grassroots ef-
forts of circuit or district courts. While these courts have adopted certain 
provisions that are praiseworthy and in some cases merit incorporation into 
the Federal Rules, these provisions only address lawsuits arising in their 
respective circuits and districts. Various other courts have not made an ef-
fort to address the limitations in the Federal Rules. Without uniform imple-
mentation of proportionality standards, discovery becomes a game of 
chance or, more troubling, parties have an incentive to go forum shop-
ping.275 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that a uniform body of proportionality ju-
risprudence could develop over time from the existing Rules regime. A sim-
ilar "wait and see" approach was rightfully rejected during the last decade in 
favor of amending the Federal Rules to address the technological advances 
affecting federal discovery practice.276 A case-by-case approach was un-
workable in that instance given that the decisions affecting discovery were 
typically issued by trial courts and did not carry precedential value.277 
Moreover, the inconsistency between the different districts issuing discov-
ery orders had created a quagmire of confusion for litigants.278 
Similarly, federal discovery practice should not be forced to rely on 
the adjudicative process to address the shortcomings of the instant rules 
regime for proportionality. The same reasoning that forced the hand of the 
Advisory Committee to implement the ESI amendments is equally applica-
ble in this instance. Indeed, given the varying local rules and practices that 
are now evolving, the opportunity for divergence in proportionality juris-
prudence is ripe. 
Simply put, discovery under the Rules should be subject to a clear 
proportionality framework. This will better enable the purposes of Rule 1 to 
274. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Dis-
covery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either 
without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary." (emphasis added)). 
275. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 231-32 (7th ed. 2008) (discussing the 
"evils of forum shopping"). 
276. See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-
Discovery Seas, I 0 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, para. 29 (2004). 
277. !d.; accordYEAZELL,supra note 275, at461. 
278. YEAZELL, supra note 275, at 461. 
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be fulfilled, benefiting all parties in this era of eDiscovery. All of this sug-
gests the need for amendments to the Federal Rules. 279 
II. UTAH RULE 26-A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 
Among the various measures enacted to address the deficiencies with 
the current proportionality regime, 280 none seems more impressive or influ-
ential than the new civil discovery rules the State of Utah implemented in 
2011.281 The dramatic changes that Utah made to its rules of civil procedure 
have vaulted proportionality into its rightful place as the benchmark for 
discovery practice in that state. Like the District of Maryland, Utah has 
plainly delineated to its lawyers and litigants that "[p ]roportionality is the 
principle governing the scope of discovery."282 Perhaps even more striking, 
Utah's objective surrounding its new proportionality rules is expressly fo-
cused on the bottom line: "[T]he cost of discovery should be proportional to 
what is at stake in the litigation."283 
Such a regime, focused on reducing the costs and burdens of discov-
ery, certainly merits consideration as a blueprint for reforming the Federal 
Rules. In this Part, we review the new amendments to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (Utah Rules)-284 In particular, we examine the provisions 
that redefine both the permissible scope of discovery and the burden of 
proof during discovery. We also discuss how Utah has achieved greater 
proportionality by expanding initial disclosure requirements and limiting 
discovery based on parties' damages claims. Finally, we emphasize the spe-
cific provisions that could be incorporated into an amendment to the Federal 
Rules. 
279. The Advisory Committee apparently recognizes the limitations of the current 
proportionality framework and is considering various proposals to better emphasize propor-
tionality in Federal Rule 26(b)(l). See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 327-31 (Nov. 
1-2, 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ Agenda 
%20Books/CiviVCV20 12-1 O.pdf. 
280. Marcus, supra note 7, at 337. 
281. "[T]he Federal Rules aggregated virtually all of the discovery devices being 
used in the various states in a way that no single state had ever done." Gensler, supra note 
64, at 523-24. 
282. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
283. /d. 
284. In addition, Utah has adopted amended rules to curb the costs of expert discov-
ery. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4) (requiring initial expert disclosures, limiting expert discovery 
to a written report or a deposition not to exceed four hours, and imposing accelerated dead-
lines for completion of expert discovery). 
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A. Redefming the Scope of Discovery and Burden of Proof During 
Discovery 
1. Proportionality Expressly Determines the Scope of Discovery 
Like the Federal Rules, the former Utah Rules285 broadly defined the 
scope of permissible discovery.286 If a discovery request sought relevant 
evidence or was reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence, the request was permitted.287 
That broad scope of discoverable material undermined important ob-
jectives of the civil rules.288 The Utah Supreme Court's Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Civil Procedure (the Committee) observed: "These broad 
standards may have secured just results by allowing a party to discover all 
facts relevant to the litigation. However, they did little to advance two 
equally important objectives of the rules of civil procedure-the speedy and 
inexpensive resolution of every action."289 
To remedy this problem, Utah redefined the scope of permissible dis-
covery.290 Today, Utah litigants "may discover any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the claim or defense of any party if the discovery satis-
fies the standards of proportionality."291 This simple yet profound change 
has effectively brought proportionality to the forefront of discovery prac-
tice. 
To eliminate any confusion regarding the nature of the "standards of 
proportionality," the Utah Rules delineate the boundaries of proportionality 
in the following subsection.292 As a baseline, the standards include those 
found in Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C).293 In addition, Utah Rule 26 requires that 
discovery be "reasonable."294 Reasonableness is based on nearly the same 
standards articulated in Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), i.e., the needs of a 
given case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the complexity 
and importance of the issues and the role of the discovery in addressing 
such issues.295 Last but not least, Utah requires that discovery expressly 
285. The "former Utah Rules" refer to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in effect 
prior to November 1, 20 II. 
286. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(b)(l) (amended 2008) (current version at UTAH R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(l)(2011)). 
287. /d. 
288. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
289. !d. (emphasis added). 
290. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(b)(l). 
291. /d. 
292. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(b)(2). 
293. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(b)(2)(B), (D)-(F). 
294. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(b)(2)(A). 
295. /d. 
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comply with the cost-cutting mandate of Utah Rule I and thereby "further 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case.m96 
These proportionality standards are certainly not new to Utah. They 
echo the long-standing, but often overlooked principles in Federal Rules 
26(b)(2)(C) and 26(g).297 The difference in Utah is that these principles have 
teeth, as they now expressly define the scope of discoverable material. 
2. Ensuring the Burden of Proof Remains with the Party Seeking 
Discovery 
One of the most important changes to the Utah Rules relates to the 
burden of proof in discovery disputes. Under the former Utah Rules and 
despite the existence of a lawyer proportionality certification requirement in 
former Utah Rule 26(g), the party objecting to discovery typically carried 
the burden of proving that the request was unduly burdensome or expen-
sive.298 Just like the current Federal Rules regime, this usually occurred 
when the objecting party sought a pr_qtective order.299 To remedy this incon-
gruity, new Utah Rule 26 now includes a specific provision placing the bur-
den of proving proportionality on the requesting party: "(b )(3) Burden. The 
party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing proportionality 
and relevance. To ensure proportionality, the court may enter orders under 
Rule 37."300 
That the requesting party always bears this burden is true whenever 
the issue of proportionality is raised, whether in a motion for protective or-
der, a motion to compel, or some other context.301 
Finally, to further emphasize this notion, Utah added an equivalent 
provision under Utah Rule 37(b)(2).302 It also provided yet another redun-
296. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
297. Hedges, supra note 43, at 5-6; Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 
F.R.D. 354, 357 (D. Md. 2008). 
298. UTAH R. C1v. P. 26(c) (amended 2008) (current version at UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(c) 
(2011)). 
299. !d. 
300. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
301. Under the former Utah Rules, a motion to compel or motion for protective order 
brought discovery to an expensive and screeching halt. Under the new Utah Rules, discovery 
motions do not toll the days to complete standard discovery. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26 advisory 
committee's note. This created the need for an expedited process to decide discovery mo-
tions. Three judicial districts in Utah adopted a local rule requiring succinct briefing and 
expedited decision of discovery motions. See, e.g., Juo. COUNCIL R. Juo. ADMIN. 10-1-306, 
available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/ch!O/IO-I-306.htm. For the rule 
adopted in the Third Judicial District, see id. The Utah Judicial Council is considering adopt-
ing this rule state-wide. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL MEETING MINUTES no. 6 (Dec. 12, 20 II), 
available at http://www.utcourts.gov/admin/judcncl/min-2011/minl2-II.pdf. 
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dancy on the burden issue in Utah Rule 37(a)(3).303 Similar to NDCA Local 
Rule 37-2, this Utah provision requires that a motion to compel be accom-
panied by a certification that the discovery in question is proportional under 
Utah Rule 26.304 All of these measures leave no doubt as to the party who 
bears the burden of establishing proportional discovery. 
3. Remedies for Non-Compliance 
To protect responding parties from disproportionate discovery and en-
sure compliance with its rules, Utah has empowered its courts with a range 
of corrective powers under Utah Rule 37.305 In particular, courts are specifi-
cally authorized to shift the costs of over-discovery from the responding 
party to the requesting party.306 Furthermore, such cost-shifting goes far 
beyond what is expressly authorized under Federal Rules 26(c)(3) and 
37(a)(5).307 
B. Additional Changes to Ensure Proportional Discovery 
1. Expanded Initial Disclosures and Penalties for Non-Compliance 
To achieve the objectives of proportionality described above, the Utah 
Advisory Committee implemented several additional changes to the Utah 
Rules. One such change included an expansion of the parties' initial disclo-
sure obligations under Utah Rule 26.308 This change was especially im-
portant to achieve proportionality. Discovery tends to be more focused and 
thus more cost-effective when parties know more about the case earlier. 
Under these expanded initial disclosures, parties must unilaterally dis-
close: 
302. UTAH R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) ("If the motion raises issues of proportionality under 
Rule 26(b)(2), the party seeking the discovery has the burden of demonstrating that the in-
formation being sought is proportional."). 
303. UTAH R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3). 
304. /d. 
305. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) ("To ensure proportionality, the court may enter orders 
under Rule 37."); UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(c). 
306. UTAH R. Civ. P. 37(c), (c)(IO) ("The court may make any order ... to achieve 
proportionality under Rule 26(b )(2), including ... that the costs, expenses and attorney fees 
of discovery be allocated among the parties as justice requires."). 
307. See Peskoff v. Faber, 251 F.R.D. 59, 60 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that cost shift-
ing applies only where not reasonably accessible data is sought under Federal Rule 26(b)(2)); 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (em-
phasizing that "cost-shifting is potentially appropriate only when inaccessible data is 
sought"). 
308. UTAH R. CJV. P. 26(a)(l). 
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• "[E]ach fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and," except for an 
adverse party, "a summary of the witness's expected testimony;"309 
• "[A] copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored infor-
mation, and tangible things in the possession or control of the party that the party 
may offer in its case-in-chief ... ;"310 
• "[A] computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable doc-
uments or evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including ma-
terials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered;"311 and 
• "[A] copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings. "311 
The plaintiffs initial disclosures are due "within 14 days after service 
of the first answer.'@ The defendant's initial disclosures are due "within 28 
days after the plaintiffs first disclosure or after that defendant's appearance, 
whichever is later.''314 A party cannot seek discovery from any source until 
its initial disclosures have been made.315 
Utah encourages the development of initial disclosures tailored to dis-
tinct areas of practice. For example, Utah Rules 26.1 and 26.2 create re-
quired disclosures tailored to domestic relations and personal injury cases, 
respectively.316 
Certainly, "[ n ]ot all information will be known at the outset of a 
case."317 Discovery is intended to identify potential witnesses and uncover 
309. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. Parties are not required to inter-
view witnesses or disclose a "detailed description[] of everything a witness might say at 
trial." !d. Rather, they must disclose "basic information concerning the subjects about which 
the witness is expected to testify" so that the other side can "determine the witness's relative 
importance in the case, whether the witness should be interviewed or deposed, and whether 
additional documents or information concerning the witness should be sought." /d. 
310. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(I)(B). 
311. UTAH R. Clv. P. 26(a)(l)(C). 
312. UTAHR.Clv.P.26(a)(I)(E). 
313. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). An amendment is pending that would make the 
plaintiffs initial disclosures due within fourteen days after filing of the first answer. See 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A) (Proposed Draft May 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/comments/2012-08/URCP026.pdf. 
314. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). An amendment is pending that would make the 
defendant's initial disclosures due forty-two days after filing of the first answer to the com-
plaint or within twenty-eight days after the defendant's appearance, whichever is later. See 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 26 (Proposed Draft 2012), available at 
http://www. utcourts.gov/resources/rules/comments/20 12-08/URCP026.pdf. 
315. UTAH R. Clv. P. 26(c)(2). 
316. Rule 26.1 requires financial declarations be submitted by each party. UTAH R. 
Civ. P. 26.1. Rule 26.2 requires disclosures from the plaintiff regarding medical history and 
loss of work, while requiring insurance and investigative information from the defendant. 
UTAH R. Clv. P. 26.2. 
317. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
974 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:933 
relevant evidence. Accordingly, parties have a continuing duty to supple-
ment initial disclosures. 318 
Failure to disclose or supplement timely comes with a stiff penalty. 
The party failing to disclose may not use the witness or document in its 
case-in-chief at trial. This "make[s] the disclosure requirement meaningful" 
and "discourage[s] sandbagging."319 
The penalty for failing to disclose or supplement timely is imposed 
under Rule 26.320 Unlike a Rule 37 sanction, it does not require a showing of 
fault, willfulness, or persistent dilatory conduct. Exclusion of undisclosed 
evidence is not automatic and may be avoided. However, the burden is on 
the non-disclosing party to show good cause or that the failure to disclose 
was harmless.321 
2. Limiting Discovery as a Matter of Right 
Another aspect of the revised Utah Rules designed to facilitate propor-
tional discovery is the limitation on the amount of discovery to which a par-
ty is entitled as a matter of right based on specific amounts in controversy. 322 
Expressly defining the amount of discovery deemed proportional creates 
certainty for parties and "limit[s] the need ... [for] judicial oversight," fac-
tors that could help drive down discovery costs.323 
To accomplish this objective, Utah divided civil litigation into three 
tiers.324 For each tier, Utah Rule 26(c) permits an amount of "standard dis-
covery" deemed to be proportional.325 For those matters involving damages 
of $300,000 or more, parties may propound twenty interrogatories, twenty 
document requests and twenty requests for admissions.326 Total fact deposi-
tion time is restricted to a mere thirty hours.327 For matters between $50,000 
and $300,000, those figures are halved.328 And for matters under $50,000, 
only five document requests and requests for admissions are allotted to the 
parties.329 Fact depositions are curtailed to three hours total per side, while 
interrogatories are eliminated. 330 
318. UTAHR.CIV.P.26(d). 
319. UTAH R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
320. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(d)(4). 
321. /d. 
322. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(c). 
323. UTAH R. C1v. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
324. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(c)(3). 
325. UTAH R. C!v. P. 26(c)(3), (5). 
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If these limits tum out to be too restrictive, parties may request "ex-
traordinary discovery" under Utah Rule 26(c)(6).331 However, any such re-
quest must demonstrate that the discovery sought is "necessary and propor-
tional" under the rules.332 In addition, the parties must certify that the re-
questing party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget.333 
C. Incorporating Provisions from the Utah Rules into Amendments to the 
Federal Rules 
The Utah Rules provide several instructive components regarding pro-
portionality that could be incorporated into amendments to the Federal 
Rules. The most obvious provision is the straightforward conditioning 
statement from Utah Rule 26(b)(l) that all discovery must satisfy propor-
tionality principles. Another key aspect is the Utah Rule 37(a)(3) propor-
tionality certification requirement, which would bring needed attention to 
counsel's Federal Rule 26(g) obligation to engage in proportional discovery. 
Finally, the language from Utah Rules 26(b)(3) and 37(b)(2) clarifying that 
the requesting party always has the burden of establishing that its discovery 
is proportional would help address an existing quirk in Federal Rule 26(c) 
that unfairly shifts that burden to the responding party. 
Including these provisions in amendments to the Federal Rules has the 
potential to bring real improvement to current federal discovery practice. 
They would make proportionality the unequivocal standard governing dis-
covery under the Rules. 
III. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
In this Part, we propose three specific amendments to the Federal 
Rules to address the current deficiencies with the proportionality frame-
work. These amendments are principally drawn from elements of the new 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, they also include aspects from 
local rules and practices promulgated by individual circuit and district 
courts. In addition to these amendments, we also suggest that other aspects 
from the Utah Rules be considered in connection with the discussion to 
make the Federal Rules more proportionality-focused. 
A. Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) 
The first amendment essentially shifts around the wording of Rule 
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permissible scope of discovery. Our suggested language for Rule 26(b)(l) is 
as follows in italics, with deletions in strikethrough: 
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. 
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of dis-
covery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged 
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense if the discovery satisfies the 
proportionality limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and Rule 
26(g)(l)(B)(iii)-including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, 
and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and loca-
tion of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court 
may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the ac-
tion. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All 
diseevery is sebjeet te the limitatioHs imposed by Rele 2e(b)(2)(C). 
This straightforward amendment enshrines proportionality squarely 
within the sentence defining the scope of discovery, elevating it out of ob-
scurity. It more clearly conditions the scope of discovery on the Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) proportionality rule. Moreover, it adds an important cross-
reference to the Rule 26(g) attorney certification requirement. By identify-
ing Rule 26(g)(l )(B)(iii) in this location, critical emphasis would finally be 
placed on the affirmative duty of lawyers to engage in proportional discov-
ery. 
B. Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(l) 
The second amendment modifies Rule 37(a)(l) to include a propor-
tionality certification requirement in connection with Rule 37 discovery 
motions. Our proposed language for Rule 37(a)(l) is as follows in italics: 
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery. 
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may 
move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer 
with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to ob-
tain it without court action and that the discovery being sought satisfies the propor-
tionality limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and Rule 26(g)(l)(B)(iii). 
This simple addition to the Rule 37 certification requirement would 
force counsel to once again re-examine its discovery to ensure that it is pro-
portional before proceeding with motion practice. While a similar provision 
has already proven successful in the NDCA, the instant amendment would 
go one step further by again reminding counsel of its obligation to conduct 
discovery within the bounds of proportionality. 
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C. Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) 
The third amendment changes Rule 26(c)(l) by requiring that the par-
ty seeking discovery demonstrate that it satisfies the proportionality rule. 
Our suggested language for Rule 26(c)(l) is as follows in italics: 
(1) In General. A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move 
for a protective order in the court where the action is pending--or as an alternative 
on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition 
will be taken. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to re-
solve the dispute without court action. If the motion raises the proportionality limi-
tations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and Rule 26(g)(l)(B)(iii), the party seeking 
the discovery has the burden of demonstrating that the information being sought 
satisfies those limitations. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense, including one or more of the following .... 
This basic amendment would ensure that the requesting party always 
has the burden of proving that the requested discovery is proportional. 
Moreover, it would eliminate the tension between Rule 26(g)(l )(B)(iii), 
which places this burden on the party seeking discovery, and Rule 26(c), 
which unfairly shifts that burden to the party seeking protection. And just as 
with the second suggested amendment, the instant proposal would again 
provide an important repetition of the Rule 26(g) requirement to engage in 
proportional discovery. 
D. Other Potential Amendments to the Federal Rules 
While we believe the foregoing amendments are absolutely essential 
to ensuring the proliferation of proportionality, there are other aspects from 
the Utah Rules that also merit consideration to help further a proportionali-
ty-driven discovery regime. One such feature is Utah's cost-shifting provi-
sion.334 By providing courts with specific authority under Federal Rule 
37(a)(5) to generally shift the costs of disproportionate discovery, judges 
would have additional power to curb abusive practices. Not only has Utah 
adopted such an approach, but the Federal Circuit's Model Order also relies 
extensively on cost-shifting to encourage reasonable and proportional dis-
covery.335 Expressly vesting federal judges with such power would undoubt-
edly advance these twin aims of enlightened discovery. 
Another Utah measure that warrants consideration in the Federal 
Rules is the notion of expanding parties' Rule 26(a) initial disclosure obli-
gations. 336 Requiring parties to disclose-and not merely identify-
334. UTAH R. Clv. P. 37(c)(l0). 
335. MODEL ORDER, supra note 11, nos. 3-4. 
336. UTAH R. Clv. P. 26 (a)(l). 
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documents supporting their positions at trial before the Rule 26(f) confer-
ence might provide them with greater insight into the positions held by the 
other side. This has the potential to foster a more productive Rule 26(f) 
planning session, which the Seventh Circuit and the District of Maryland 
have identified as a key step for ensuring proportional discovery.337 By stiff-
ening the penalties for non-compliance as the Utah Rules have done, parties 
would be incentivized to provide full disclosure of required information. 
Finally, the Federal Rules should consider imposing some type of lim-
itation on the amount of discovery a party is entitled to as a matter of 
right-the standard discovery deemed proportional based on the amount in 
controversy, case type, or some other workable criteria. Without any limita-
tion on the number of requests, parties have traditionally had little incentive 
to shoot with a discovery rifle, rather than a shotgun. With limitations, how-
ever, boilerplate interrogatories and document requests would be replaced 
with targeted requests. 338 Such discovery "boundaries" would also force 
lawyers and clients to take more seriously the "stop and think" requirement 
from Rule 26(g).339 Not only could this lead to better prepared discovery 
requests, it might also cause discovery to focus on the merits instead of 
costly eDiscovery sideshows like those feared by the Leksi court.340 
Coupling standard discovery limits with an "extraordinary discovery" 
option simply mandates the staging of discovery.341 This enables lawyers, 
parties, and judges-prepared with the information learned in standard dis-
covery-to make informed decisions about what additional discovery is 
necessary and proportional. Some form of this option would be a substantial 
improvement over the current rules where discovery decisions (including 
judicial oversight) often occur in a factual vacuum characteristic of litiga-
tion in its infancy. 
337. See 7TH CIR. ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., at princ. 2.05-2.06, supra note 175; 
Protocol, supra note 207, para. 6-9. 
338. See Cal cor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567, 570-71 
(Ct. App. 1997) (encouraging litigants to use discovery devices in a manner that is "well 
calibrated; the lancet is to be preferred over the sledge hammer"). 
339. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note (explaining that Rule 26(g) "pro-
vides a deterrent to both excessive discovery and evasion by imposing a certification re-
quirement that obliges each attorney to stop and think about the legitimacy of a discovery 
request, a response thereto, or an objection"). 
340. Leksi, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 99, 105-06, 113 (D.N.J. 1989). 
341. See DCG Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Technologies, LLC, No. C-11-03792 PSG, 
2011 WL 5244356, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (noting that the Federal Circuit's Model 
Order provides for mandatory phasing of discovery in patent litigation). 
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CONCLUSION 
The amendments we have proposed could be painful medicine for 
lawyers who are used to conducting litigation under the current framework. 
Nevertheless, these changes are necessary to address the unrestrained costs 
and current shortcomings of the Federal Rules. Our proposed amendments 
represent a simple and prudent way of emphasizing that counsel and clients 
alike must engage in proportional discovery. 
Keeping the big picture in mind, these reforms are necessary to ensure 
that cases are decided on their merits. Discovery is perhaps the most critical 
phase of litigation. It provides an opportunity to evaluate the merits of 
claims and defenses, teeing matters up for disposition through settlement, 
summary judgment, or trial. Yet the skyrocketing costs of discovery have 
hijacked that grand vision. Many litigants cannot afford to prosecute merito-
rious claims to trial, while others settle specious lawsuits to avoid the dis-
covery bill. We should act boldly now to correct this unfair and unaccepta-
ble situation. To do so, the Federal Rules must be modified to ensure that 
discovery is proportional to what is at stake in the litigation. Only then will 
the elusive vision of Rule 1 be realized. 

